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1. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY 
The Community started in the mid eighties to put emphasis on the creation of a single 
financial market, to integrate the different national financial markets and create a 
more efficient and stable single financial market. 
Steps accomplished in this process were: 
1. The liberalization of capital movements within the Community. Capital move-
ments have been essentially fully liberalized since 1 July 1990 by virtue of Council 
Directive 88/3611/EEC. The freedom of capital movements has been reinforced 
by the Treaty on European Union: Its Article G(I4) replaces Articles 67 to 73 by 
the new Articles 73b to 73h. These new Articles, in force since 1 January 1994, 
enshrine the directly applicable freedom of capital movements within the EU, and 
also with some reservations, with third countries, in the Treaty. As from 16 May 
1994, the derogation for Greece, and thus all country specific derogations, 
ceased to exist. 
The Commission issued on 19 July 1997 a Communication on "Certain legal as-
pects on Intra-EU investment" (OJ C 220 of 19/7/1997, p. 15 ff.), clarifying the 
conditions under which discriminatory and non-discriminatory measures as re-
gards investment are compatible with Art. 52 and 73b of the EC Treaty. 
2. The freedom of cross-border financial services has been accomplished in the 
banking sector, by a series of directives, notably the 2nd Banking Directive 
89/646/EEC. It establishes the freedom of cross-border services under the 
principle of a single license and control by the home country under the regime 
of common rules on admission and supervision. The insurance market was 
equally opened up to cross-border services from 1 July 1994 on, when the 3rd 
life and non-life directives entered into force. The opening of securities 
markets for cross-border services within the Community complemented and 
completed the opening of financial services from 1 January 1996 with the 
entering into force of Directive 93/22/EEC. 
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The aim was to allow, by removing administrative ob-
stacles, the creation of a single financial market structure 
in the Community1. Such a single financial market should 
in particular 
• increase cross-border competition on EU financial 
markets and thereby enhance development and effi-
ciency of financial markets and financial institutions; 
In order to reach such conclusions the paper starts with a 
succinct assessment of the main features of the financial 
sector in the European Union. This assessment concen-
trates on the main sectors of financial markets and institu-
tions and casts some light on the specific features of the EU 
as compared to other major financial markets, but also re-
maining differences, as regards the structure or the degree 
of development, within the European Union. 
reduce the volatility in and failure risk of the financial 
system by creating a larger and more stable market 
sphere; 
The first results nevertheless give a few indications about 
the general situation and areas of concern: 
• thereby strengthen its main allocative function, the 
channelling of savings into productive resources with 
the highest return to capital. 
Although first evidence suggests that progress has been 
made on all these targets, there remain doubts if this devel-
opment has gone sufficiently far. 
Assessing the Community economy on the basis of the Com-
mission "White Paper"2, the European Council (10/11 De-
cember 1993, Brussels) concluded, among other items, that 
"the capital market must be made more efficient in order to 
encourage a flow of savings into productive job-creating 
investments"3. 
The present study deals with some of the issues identified as 
significant for an assessment of the result of the programme 
of financial integration of EU financial markets. It is 
neither exhaustive nor does it give definite answers, but is 
rather a starting point for further more detailed analysis on 
this matter, concentrating on a few main issues: 
• the general level and development of financial markets ' 
activity over the past 10 years; 
• the degree of assimilation and integration of financial 
markets of Member States over the past 10 years; 
• the development of the efficiency of financial markets 
and financial integration in the Community; 
• the eventual costs of financial integration and liberaliz-
ation over the past years; 
Although the volume of private domestic savings ap-
pears relatively satisfactory, it reached 22% of GDP in 
1995, the available pool of savings for private sector in-
vestment could be further enhanced by a greater conso-
lidation of public deficits. Institutional investors, such 
as insurance companies or pension funds, are now play-
ing an increasingly crucial role in channelling savings 
into investment. On an EU level, around 30% of private 
savings are collected by these institutions. 
Cross-border capital movements between Member 
States play a growing and positive role in investment in 
the Union and in a more efficient allocation of savings. 
However this process is still in its early stages and the 
Member States' financial markets are only to some de-
gree integrated. 
Company financing relies mainly on direct bank lend-
ing. This reflects, amongst other factors, an on average 
high efficiency of EC banking. However, in a few Mem-
ber States the efficiency of the domestic banking system 
lags behind the Community average. 
• Furthermore, securities markets, both as an alternative 
and a complement to bank lending in financing invest-
ment, are inefficient in some areas or non-existent in 
some Member States. This factor weighs more heavily 
on smaller companies and, generally, on companies in 
smaller countries, where the limited size of domestic 
capital markets makes it more difficult to obtain invest-
ment financing at competitive terms. The development 
of specialist markets seems to have had, so far, an over-
all positive impact on the efficiency and stability of the 
securities markets. 
remaining obstacles to further integration of the EU fi-
nancial markets in the field of market structure and re-
gulation 
See therefore in detail: Commission of the European Communities, Directorate-Gen-
eral for Economic and Financial Affairs: "Creation of a European financial area"; Euro-
pean Economy, No 36, May 1988. 
Growth, Competitiveness, Employment.- The Challenges and Ways Forward into the 
21st Century"; Brussels 1993. 
Presidency conclusions - Brussels, 10 and II December 1993 (SN 373/93). 
Some obstacles remain to reaping the full benefits of the 
Internal financial market in the European Union. A 
minimum harmonization in the field of the taxation of 
savings and in taxation of corporate profits could im-
prove the functioning of the internal market. The adop-
tion of a Community minimum withholding tax on in-
terest income would be an important step towards that 
goal. 
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VOLUME AND STRUCTURE OF SAVINGS 
AND CAPITAL FLOWS 
2.1 Domestic savings 
The savings structure of domestic sectors in the EU has in 
the past 10 years been subject to a cyclical pattern, but apart 
from this component been relatively stable: households 
had in 1995 saving rates of between 18% in Belgium to 7% 
in Portugal. In most Member States household savings 
were slightly declining between 1985 and 1989. The early 
eighties and late eighties, under a situation of recession and 
recovery respectively have seen higher and lower savings 
contributions by the household sector. In the same period 
corporate savings were up, which led to an overall stable 
rate of private savings of around 22% in 1995, slightly up 
from21%in 1985. These rates were relatively strongly ris­
ing in Belgium, Austria, Finland and Sweden, and signifi­
cantly declining in Greece, Ireland and Italy. 
Together with a relatively stable net borrowing requirement 
of the public sector of 4—4.5% (with higher and lower va­
lues in recession and recovery times) this allowed the cor­
porate sector to maintain a borrowing requirement of nearly 
2% in 1990/91, about the same as in the early eighties, and 
clearly above the much lower borrowing requirement of 
companies in the mid and late eighties. 
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This situation compares to the one in Japan, where a private 
savings contribution of almost double the relative size 
fuelled company borrowing from 5 to 7 % and even more 
than 10 in 1990/91, a situation of exceptional circum­
stances. The US on the other hand has built on much lower 
private savings over the past 10 years. Considerable 
foreign capital inflow has nevertheless not allowed the US 
corporate sector to borrow on the capital markets at an 
equal level than in the EU, or even in Japan. 
Although the volume of private domestic savings appears 
relatively satisfactory, the available pool of savings for pri­
vate sector investment could be further enhanced by a fu­
ture consolidation policy of public borrowers and by an in 
GRAPH 2 : Gross national saving EU15 
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creasing private funding of old age retirement systems, due 
to the demographic change the Community will undergo 
within the next decades. 
The structure of household savings still varies considerably 
among Member States (see table 1). However, in most 
Member States the bulk of household savings is directed to­
wards bank deposits. Available figures for 1995 show a 
share of deposits in total household savings between 33.4% 
(Italy) and 53.7% (Spain). However in all Member States, 
for which data are available, the share of savings at institu­
tional investors, and to a minor degree, of securities, is in­
creasing in household portfolios of financial assets. This is 
particularly pronounced in Netherlands and France, where 
more than half of household savings are already channelled 
through insurance or pension plans. Thus the role of the 
banking industry is on this level slowly eroding. 
TABLE 1 
D 
E 
F 
I 
S(1993) 
: Structure of household savings 
(in % of total claims, year end 1995) 
cash and 
deposits 
43.6 
53.7 
36.0 
33.4 
41.6 
long­term 
securities 
28.7 
25.7 
42.3 
39.1 
22.0 
Source : OECD, own calculations. 
pension fund 
and life insur­
ance equity 
24.5 
10.4 
16.5 
10.2 
15.9 
others 
3.2 
10.2 
5.2 
17.3 
20.5 
2.2 Savings and financial liberalization 
In some countries outside the European Union it had to be 
noted in particular during the past decade that financial lib­
eralization led in some instants to an, at least temporary, sig­
nificant decrease in private savings in the respective 
country. Such a development was attributed to two distinct 
development: 
• the reallocation of financial assets which were before 
the liberalization to artificially large degrees held in the 
country. Such a reallocation resulted in respective capi­
tal outflows, not sufficiently matched by increased in­
flows of capital from abroad and therefore in a reduction 
in net foreign savings. 
the liberalization of borrowing and lending led to an in­
crease of lending to the privates sector and therefore to a 
net reduction of net domestic savings. 
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The Community has been mostly able to avoid such prob­
lems when advancing its internal liberalization. Neverthe­
less the Community also experienced major swings in real 
asset prices over that period. Prices of commercial real es­
tate, more so than prices for residential property, were ris­
ing in the Community, as in many other parts of the world in 
the eighties, before peaking in the late eighties. Since then 
real estate prices have strongly dropped also in the Com­
munity, by around 40 - 50%% which is in line with devel­
opments on major markets outside the Community. How­
ever these changes have not led to the strains in the financial 
industry as in other markets. 
2.3 International capital flows 
2.3.1 Capital movements and financial integration 
The availability of funds for domestic capital accumulation 
is increasingly influenced by cross-border capital move­
ments. Such transactions are growing considerably faster 
than corss-border merchandise trade or trade in services, 
and thus the fastest growing type of cross-border transac­
tions. Capital movements are essentially liberalized within 
the Community since 1 July 19904. 
In many Member States, however they have been liberal­
ized well before that date. Therefore the effective transition 
to full freedom of capital movements for the Community as 
a whole was more than a gradual process extending over a 
considerable number of years. 
The common measures of interest rate parities suggest that 
after the liberalization capital can now move fairly freely 
between Member States5, that is the criterion of covered in­
terest rate parity holds. They have allowed a continued de­
coupling of domestic investment from domestic saving in 
the EU Member States. 
Chart 4 shows the gradual development of the relationship 
between domestic savings and domestic investment within 
EU Member States between 1985 and 1994: in an economy 
completely closed for capital flows the 45° line, thus the 
identity of domestic savings and investment, should hold. 
However the gradual "flattening" of the regression line re­
flects the growing independence of domestic investment 
form the available pool of domestic savings, thanks to 
foreign capital6. 
4 With some countries enjoying a transitory period in which they could maintain some 
forms of capital movements. All these transition periods ended in May 1994 (with the 
full liberalization by Greece) at the latest. 
5 Lemmen, Jan, Eijfinger, Sylvester; "The Price Approach to Financial Integration: De­
composing European Money Market Interest Rate Differentials"; Tilburg University 
Center Discussion paper, January 1994. This finding suggests that perfect "covered in­
terest rate parity" now prevails, imperfectly only for die case of Greece and Portugal 
(those countries which maintained capital controls the longest). Uncovered interest rate 
parity however is much less established, to be found only between Germany and the 
Netherlands. 
6 Even under prefect capital mobility the correlation between the investment and savings 
ratios of different countries is not necessarily zero. In particular in case of immobile 
labour, external shocks, such as new specific technologies, might equally affect domes­
tic investment and savings. See e. g. M. Obstfeld, Capital Mobility in the World Econ­
omy: Theory and Measurement", Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public 
Policy 24 (Spring 1986) pp. 55-103. 
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Box 1: The Feldstein-Horioka condition for capital mobility 
The Feldstein-Horioka condition1 for perfect capital 
mobility, namely that due to freely flowing interna­
tional capital flows, domestic savings and investment 
plans are uncorrected, delivers weak, but positive evi­
dence that the EU as a whole has been more open to the 
rest of the world as regards capital movements. There­
fore the link between domestic savings and investment 
plans has become weaker. 
If the regression equation I/Y = α + β S/Y + u, where 
S/Y is the share of national savings at GDP, I/Y the 
share of investment at GDP, a and β parameters and u 
an error term is estimated2, the following estimates 
occur, depending on the sample period: 
Feldstein-Horioka equation: estimates for EU 
(15) 
a) absolute values 
sample period 
1971-89 
1990-95 
a 
1.65 
-1.8 
0.93 
1.18 
R 
0.93 
0.82 
The regression equation Δ(Ι/Υ) = α + β A(S/Y) + u, 
where A(S/Y) is the change in the share of national 
savings at GDP over the previous year and Δ(Ι/Υ) the 
change in share of investment at GDP, α and β para­
meters and u an error term, gives the following esti­
mates, depending on the sample period: 
b) changes over previous year 
sample period α β R 
1971-89 
1990 - 95 
0.05 
-0.18 
1.0 
0.81 
0.76 
0.74 
According to these estimates, the more recent period^ 
of 1990-1995 which essential reflects the period after 
the full abolition of capital controls, shows a weaker 
dependence between investment and savings plans 
within the Community. However, it is widely accepted 
that this measure would be affected by external shocks 
both affecting savings and investment and therefore 
distorting the estimate results. 
Feldstein M.; Horioka, C. ( 1980), "Domestic saving and international capital flows". 
Economic Journal, No. 358, pp. 314—29; see also Obstfeld, M. ( 1994) "International 
capital mobility in the 1990's", CEPR Discussion paper. No. 902 for an explicit use 
of this criterion on time series rather than cross-sectional data, the original approach 
by the former authors. 
Ordinary least squares (OLS). 
GRAPH 4 : Gross fixed capital formation growth versus gross 
savings - EU 15 (as % of GDP) 
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The effects of capital liberalization and market integration 
in the Community have been both direct, being reflected in 
changes in the cross-border flow of funds, as well as in­
direct, taking the form of structural changes in financial 
markets and in the prices of financial services. Although 
capital mobility is certainly the initiating force and a pre­
requisite for these changes, both direct and indirect effects 
can be considered as the result of interaction of capital lib­
eralization, government reforms and market induced in­
novations. 
There is an apparent high correlation between domestic and 
foreign investment by Community investors. As foreign 
investment in the Community is less cyclical, net capital in­
flows into the Community are negatively correlated to the 
business cycle. 
GRAPH 5 : EU net capital imports* and domestic investment** 
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2.3.2 Community developments and global trends 
There was, in recent years a spectacular growth of interna­
tional capital movements. This development was, how­
ever, more pronounced in the Community. The main fea­
tures of this development are as follows: 
• sharp growth of all categories of capital, in particular di­
rect and portfolio investment; 
• increased attractiveness of Community for direct in­
vestment capital; 
• the emergence of Japan and more recently other 
countries in South East Asia as major sources of direct 
investment capital. 
The main recent developments in the movement of direct 
and portfolio investment are shown in table 2. 
GRAPH 6 : European Union*: Capital income 
in Bn. ECU 
TABLE 2 : Capital flows (Bn 
Direct 
Investment 
1994 1995 
ECU) 
Portfolio 
Investment 
1994 1995 
Other 
Investment 
1994 1995 
Outflows 
EU* 
USA 
Japan 
Inflows 
EU* 
USA 
93.1 
46.6 
15.3 
60.0 
40.8 
Japan 0.8 
*EU 15, including intra 
Source : Eurostat. 
109.5 
72.8 
17.2 
91.6 
46.0 
0 
EU flows. 
107.3 
50.8 
75.9 
64.9 
116.4 
98.4** 
75.2 
65.7 
151.7** 
180.3 
56.6 38.6 
** without BLEU. 
19.6 
33.6 
29.6 
101.3 
83.0 
-9.1 
258.5** 
79.6 
78.4 
222.1** 
97.7 
73.6 
Growth in international capital movements peaked in 
1989-90. Since then, there was a contraction of capital 
flows world-wide, a phenomenon linked to the beginning 
recession and increased uncertainty about asset price devel­
opments. 
However, the recent contraction of direct investment flows 
has been much less pronounced in the Community com­
pared to that witnessed in the USA or Japan, while flows of 
portfolio capital continued to grow in contrast to the above-
mentioned global trend. The growth of portfolio capital 
from and to Member States has been most spectacular in the 
past years, growing by almost 300% between 1990 and 
1993. A good part of the 1993 growth is due to withholding 
tax circumvention strategies of German residents, invest­
ing via Luxembourg. 
There are no comprehensible data for capital movements 
between Member States on the one hand and between 
Member States and third countries on the other hand, ex­
cept for the category of foreign direct investment. How­
ever, available indirect evidence, such as banking statistics 
or data for income from foreign capital, seem to suggest that 
overall intra-EU flows have risen much more strongly than 
capital flows with third countries. This would reflect the 
complete liberalization of capital movements and financial 
1985 = 100 
50 
net balance with non-EU 
I 
85 87 89 91 93 85 87 89 91 93 
EC(12); **: average of credits and debits. 
Source : Eurostat. 
services within the EU and the indirect effects of the general 
single market programme. 
Nevertheless capital movements with third countries have 
also risen strongly over the past decade, reflecting the on­
going integration of the EC financial markets into global 
markets. 
It seems that, as compared to other major countries, such as 
the US or Japan, this growth of capital movements with 
third countries was particularly strong in the field of port­
folio and debt flows, and less in the field of foreign direct 
investment. 
The EU financial markets and institutions play a major role 
in the debt financing of less developed countries and 
countries in transition. European banks hold around 60% 
of all debt to such countries, far ahead of the US and Japan. 
Bank lending is particularly strong to Eastern Europe Afri­
ca and the Middle East, where European banks finance the 
overwhelming par of foreign debt. However, even in Latin 
America and Asia, European banks are the main lenders, 
even before North American and Japanese banks, respect­
ively. 
GRAPH 7 : Bank lending to LDC's and Eastern Europe 
Claims at end of 1996; distribution by region of 
borrower and nationality of banks 
Bn. USD * Europe Β North America Q Japan cz others 
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Source: BIS. 
2.3.3 Direct investment 
The sustained level of direct investment flows in the Com-
munity, despite an adverse macroeconomic environment, 
can be attributed to the good medium to long-term pros-
pects associated mainly with the completion of the Single 
Market. These considerations seem to outweigh, in the per-
ception of entrepreneurs, the adverse impact of the recent 
difficult cyclical phase. 
An insight might be gained from the comparative examin-
ation of inward (originating from outside the Community), 
outward (from the Community to the rest of the world) and 
intra-Community direct investment. 
GRAPH 8 : Foreign direct investment (FM) (») 
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Inward direct investments grew at a much higher rate than 
outward direct investment over until 1990, although the ab­
solute amounts of the latter remained also significant. Spe­
cifically the ratio inward/outward direct investment rose to 
about 0.80 in 1991 up from 0.35 in 1984, a development 
indicating the increasing attractiveness of the Community 
for foreign investors. Inward direct investment started to 
moderately decline after 1990, its level remain significant 
and, as noted above, contracted much less than the world­
wide trend of direct investment flows. Foreign direct in­
vestment by EU investors in third countries have strongly 
grown since 1992, and in 1996 they clearly exceeded the 
level of intra­EU investment, as regularly until 1988. 
EU FDI in developing countries is, compared to industrial 
countries, relatively low. Furthermore, it is concentrated on 
a relatively few number of countries. As compared to the 
US, and unlike in bank lending, the EU has a very clear defi­
cit in FDI both in Latin America and in Asia. Only in Africa 
and the Middle East EU investors are more strongly repre­
sented than their US counterparts. 
Also, noteworthy was the development of intra­Commun­
ity direct investment as a percentage of total direct invest­
ment in the Community. Intra­Community direct invest­
ment rose to 60% of the total in 1991 compared to 40% in 
GRAPH 9 : FDI to LDC's and Eastern Europe 
(flows 1992­94; distribution by regions of host and 
nationality of investor, in Bn. ECU) 
40 
30 
20 
10 
Bn. ECU □ EU(12) US 
US: n.a. 
Eastern Europe Africa and Middle Latin America 
Source : Eurostat. 
Asia 
1984. This development indicates that although inward di­
rect investment grew sharply, intra­Community direct in­
vestment grew even faster. This development can be at­
tributed to the "Single Market" effect, i. e. the aim of 
European companies to strengthen their presence and es­
tablish strategic alliances and to benefit from the Single 
Market. 
GRAPH 10 : Foreign direct investment inflows 
(in percent of gross fixed capital formation) 
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The contribution of foreign direct investment to the produc­
tive potential of Member States has been significant. Over­
all the share of FDI (including intra­EU flows) in total 
gross fixed capital formation rose from 2.9% in 1985 to 
6.5% in 1995. In certain cases the share of direct invest­
ment in gross fixed capital formation rose by several 
magnitudes, while in almost all Member States this share 
rose significantly. For example, in B/L this share rose by 
twelve from 7.5% in 1985 to 19.5% in 1995, in the UK from 
7.4% to 17.8% and in Denmark from 1% to 15%. 
Following the recent contraction of direct investment flows 
mentioned above, the share of direct investment in gross 
fixed capital formation declined from the peak levels of 
1990­91. Beyond its significant quantitative contribution, 
foreign direct investment constitutes a qualitative input to 
the productive potential of the recipient economies. Identi­
­ 8 ­
fied benefits include the use of modern technology, im­
proved organization and better management skills. 
However international competition for capital has in­
creased in the past years. The increase in competition has 
partly stemmed from developing countries. These have 
seen a dramatic rise in FDI inflows, after years of generally 
being deprived of this source of financing (see table 3). 
T A B L E 3: Direct investment : Inflows 
(Bn $, annual averages) 
Total 
Industrial countries 
of which: United States 
Japan 
Western Europe 
Less developed countries 
of which: Asia 
Eastern Europe 
Latin America 
1986­90 
147.6 
124.1 
53.1 
0.3 
60.5 
23.5 
13.7 
0.2 
3.Ö 
1991­95 
193.9 
161.0 
38.9 
1.8 
96.1 
32.8 
20.2 
0.6 
6.8 
1996 
83.9 
0.2 
87.9* 
Source : BIS, OECD. 
* partly estimated. 
The European Union has now to compete for this resource 
in an increasingly competitive international environment. 
2.3.4 Portfolio investment and financial markets 
The steep rise in the flows of portfolio capital into and with­
in the Community in recent years was the result of a number 
of factors: the removal of restrictions on the movement of 
capital, the increasing sensitivity of investors to yield dif­
ferentials and portfolio diversification considerations and 
the relaxation of the limits on investments made by institu­
tional investors. 
GRAPH 11 : Cross­border transactions in bonds and equities 
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The growth of portfolio investment capital reflects also the 
increasing sophistication and attractiveness of national 
equity and bond markets, notably government bond 
markets. It indicates at the same time the enhanced possibi­
lities offered to Treasuries to tap the huge Community pool 
of savings. Existing data show that a substantial share of 
GRAPH 12 : Portfolio investment 
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Source : Eurostat. 
the portfolio capital investment reflects indeed increased 
acquisition of government paper by non­residents. 
Furthermore the growth of mentioned institutional in­
vestors has enhanced cross­border securities' investment. 
Although institutions are in many countries (see below) still 
effectively constrained from investing abroad on the basis 
of some "prudential" rules, the overall internationalization 
of institutional investors' portfolios has considerably 
grown over the past years, and thus substantially affected 
the degree of competition and of efficiency of different 
national capital markets and financial systems. 
2.3.5 Country risk and interest rates 
Some of the persistent differences in real interest rates are 
explained by different risk levels associated to the respect­
ive countries by foreign potential investors. For the Com­
munity some differences in this perceived risk remain. The 
country risks attributed by the large two rating agencies 
might indicate this situation (see table 4). 
T A B L E 4: 
B 
DK 
D 
E L 
E 
F 
IRL 
I 
L 
NL 
A 
Ρ 
FIN 
S 
U K 
Source 
Risk ratings for E U M e m b e r States 
(long term debt in foreign currency) 
Moody's 
Moody's 
Aal 
Aal 
Aaa 
Baal 
Aa2 
Aaa 
Aa2 
Aa3 
Aaa 
Aaa 
Aaa 
Al 
Aal 
Aa3 
Aaa 
Standardoi Poors;2/1997. 
S&P 
AA+ 
AA+ 
AAA 
AA 
AAA 
AA 
AA 
AAA 
AAA 
AAA 
AA­
AA 
AA+ 
AAA 
For the past years there has been a continued correlation be­
tween interest rates and the perceived country risk. This 
relationship has not always been stable, but nevertheless 
significant. It shows that international mobility of capital is 
high enough to lead to a fairly efficient allocation of capital. 
It furthermore underlines the importance of such ratings 
obtained by rating agencies for the pricing of sovereign 
debt and thus the general interest level of the country. The 
following chart, on the basis of the above given country risk 
ratings by the two major rating agencies (ratings translated 
into cardinal numbers) 
GRAPH 13 : Country risk and interest rates 
(real interest rates, 1996 average adjusted 
by GDP deflator) 
5 
4 
3 
2 
1 
0 
­1 
short­term rates 
♦ long­term ­ short­term rates ("yield curve") 
Aaa/AAA Aal/AA+ Aa2/AA Aa3/AA 
average of Moody's and S&P rating, converted into cardinal values, end 1996 
Source : European Commission, Moody's, Standard & Poors. 
The respective results of simple OLS regression estimates 
are 
p 
Î' 
1.24 + 0.76 cr; 
(0.57) 
= 5.25 
(0.25) 
0.06 cr; 
r2 = 0.47 
r2 = 0.003 
(0.85) (0.36) 
standard errors in brackets; 
îs and ï1 : (1996) short­term and long­term interest rates, 
adjusted by the change in the GDP deflator; 
cr : country risk variable, at the end of 1996, aver­
age of Moody's and Standard & Poors risk rat­
ing for foreign currency debt. 
Whereas the relationship between country risk and real 
short­term rates seems to be significant, the corresponding 
impact on real long­term rates seems much weaker. This 
result might, however, also be the effect of a misspecifica­
tion of real long­term rates, where inflation expectations 
and actual inflation might more considerably differ, than on 
a short period. 
3. FINANCIAL MARKETS STRUCTURE 
3.1 Volume of financial markets 
The role of financial markets in Europe is continually in­
creasing. Financial assets have continued to increase 
strongly in all Member States, also (with the exception of 
Austria) in relation to the Gross Domestic Product. This 
underlines the increasing role of financial markets in the 
functioning of Member States' economies. 
GRAPH 14 : Financial assets of national economy 
(in % of GDP) 
ta 1 9 9 5* □ 1986 
DK D E F IRL I NL Α Ρ FIN S UK 
Source : Eurostat. 
Loans to private sector borrowers at the end of 1995 re­
ached more than 80% in percentage of GDP, up from less 
than 60% in 1980. The increase has been particularly 
strong in the period from 1987 to 1992, whereas in the US 
and Japan private sector borrowing has been relatively con­
stant or even declining in the past three years. 
Two factors explain this different pattern of the late eighties 
and early nineties of Europe: the economic downturn came 
later than in the other large economic areas, and, secondly, 
European banks were not plagued by lack of own capital as 
was the case with rival banks in North America and Japan. 
Intra­EU differences are large: particularly high are these 
figures for Luxembourg (152% in 1992) and the UK 
(115%). However, these two countries serve as interna­
tional financial centres, thus these figures, as regards do­
mestic intermediation are biased upwards. For the other 
countries, this ratio varies between about 100% (D and 
F)and 30 to 45% (B, DK, I, IRL). 
In the same period, relative disintermediation continued, 
the securities markets increased their share even more 
strongly. From 1987 to 1992 the value of outstanding bonds 
increased strongly to about 60% at the end of 1992. 
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GRAPH 15 : Loans to private sector 
% of GDP 
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Source : IMF. 
Behind this EU average, considerable differences in the 
depth of financial intermediation in different EU countries 
prevail (see table 5). This is mostly explained by the re­
spective roles of domestic banking: countries with high fi­
nancial intermediation equally show a high degree of bank­
ing intermediation. 
TABLE 5 
Β 
D 
E 
F 
I 
F 
S 
Financial Intermediation in 
Financial 
intermediation rate' 
1985 
47.6 
49.6 
47.6 
48.9 
n.a. 
52.7 
46.54 
1995 
58.5 
52.8 
51.24 
42.4 
39.9 
52.83 
49.6 
the EU Member States 
Banking 
intermediation rate2 
1985 
91.8 
80.1 
75.0 
82.8 
n.a. 
61.9 
40.9 
1995 
90.2 
80.3 
70.84 
73.8 
70.3 
62.03 
33.24 
1 Financial assets of financial institutions in percent of total financial assets. 2 Financial assets of banks in percent of financial assets of financial sector. 
3 1993. 4 1994. 
Source : OECD, own calculations. 
3.2 Structure of financial intermediation 
The data which exist (OECD, not fully harmonized, finan­
cial accounts statistics) show particularly vast differences 
in the use of loans vs. shares (see table 6). Loan financing is 
particularly important in Spain and Germany, as it is in 
Scandinavia or Japan. Overall bank credit amounted, end 
of 1992, to 89% of indebtedness of non-financial com­
panies in Germany, 82% in France, 68% in Italy, and only 
63% in the UK. Financing by shares are relatively signifi­
cant in the UK, France and Italy. A striking phenomenon all 
over Europe seems to be the absence of company bond is­
sues (unlike the USA, where bonds play a major role in 
company finance). 
On the other side, household saving (see chapter 2), similar 
differences in financial allocation behaviour exist within 
the Community compared to other countries. 
TABLE 6 : Balance sheet of non-financial enterprises 
(in percent of total liabilities) 
1985 1994 1985 1994 1985 
equity 
Β 34.3 
D 39.5 
DK 42.3 
E 
F 
I 24.4 
NL 40.8 
A 38.2 
FIN 27.8 
S 34.8 
U K 68-9: 
equity 
40.9 
39.9 
46.5 
39.8 
38.8 
23.5 
43.8* 
46.5 
35.5* 
33.8* 
68.3* 
* 
short-
term 
liab. 
42 
42.9 
42.2 
48.2 
35.8 
45.5 
39.4 
40 
31.1 
short-
term 
liab. 
38.8 
44.9 
37.2 
38.2 
37.7 
52.2 
29.5* 
37.6 
25.7* 
39.5* 
31.7 
long-
term 
liab. 
23.8 
17.6 
15.5 
27.4 
23.5 
16.3 
32.8 
25.2 
** 
1994 
long-
term 
liab 
20.4 
15.3 
16.3 
22.1 
23.5 
24.2 
26.8* 
15.9 
38.8* 
26.7* 
** 
Source : OECD, Financial accounts of OECD countries. 
Again France shows a relatively high degree of stock 
market culture. In 1992 43.6% of all financial savings of 
French households went into shares, compared to 0.2% in 
Germany. In all EU countries, for which data exist, the 
main increase in household assets has been in the form of 
net equity on life insurance reserves and pension funds. 
Thus household saving undergoes a pooling in the hands of 
institutional investors. 
This difference is mainly due to historical reasons. A cer­
tain form of financial intermediation has played a more or 
less prominent role; this relative structure has been mutual­
ly supported by financing decisions of households and 
companies and enforced by the development of those finan­
cial institutions with the respective expertise. Thus, a high 
degree of loan financing, and thus low securitization, nor­
mally coincides with the universal banking type system. 
In all European countries all the major segments of finan­
cial markets are developed to some extent, but to a very dif­
ferent degree. Some market segments, particularly playing 
a role in the financing of companies, do not exist in some 
Member States. Commercial paper instruments have for a 
long time played a prominent role in the US as an alterna­
tive source of company finance to direct loans, although the 
relative difference to loans has been almost wiped out by 
the strong involvement of banks in the placing of such 
paper, by opening its client base to such issues and by guar­
anteeing the placement of such paper (Revolving Under­
writing Facilities). Commercial paper markets exist in six 
EU countries (B, D, E, F, NL, UK). But only in France and 
Spain does Commercial Paper play a sizeable role. 
3.3 Banking industry 
3.3.1 Loans and deposit taking 
Classical banking intermediation by deposit taking and loans 
is still, as noted, the main channel of saving and investment 
financing in the Community. All EU Member States have a 
well developed banking sector active in this market. 
­ l i ­
The efficiency of the respective domestic banking sectors 
improved slightly in the eighties7. However large cross­
country differences remain. Various different measures of 
efficiency can be applied: staff costs per deposit, which 
give information on the cost side of intermediation; or net 
interest income per deposit, which also takes into account a 
possible lack of competition within the banking sector, and 
thus adds information on the efficiency of the industry 
structure . The most efficient banking sectors, under both 
criteria, are to be found in Germany and the Netherlands 
(apart from the special situation in Luxembourg). The in­
dustries in the other EU countries are in an intermediate 
group (although no data is available for Greece or Portu­
gal), whereas in Italy the lowest, by far, cost efficiency pre­
vails. The situation is more complex as regards the other 
criterion on interest rate margins; apart from the two effi­
cient countries mentioned, other countries show very dif­
ferent results. The UK, Belgium, and Denmark follow, 
with a certain margin between each of these. Relatively 
poor figures emerge for Spain, France, and Italy (see 
table 7). 
GRAPH 16 : Bank efficiency 1985­1994 
non­bank deposits/staff costs 
TABLE 7 : Banking performance 
labour costs 
interest spread 
low 
medium 
high 
low 
D,NL,L 
Source : Jordi Guai, D. Neven: Banking; in 
Studies 1993(3). 
medium 
UK 
B.DK 
E , F 
high 
I 
European Economy; Reports and 
Β DK D EL E F* I L NL A* Ρ FIN S 
Source : OECD, own calculations. 
These results partly reflect the state of banking deregulation 
in Member States: 
• in countries where regulation was not extensive already 
in 1985, such as the UK, Germany, and the Netherlands, 
financial margins decreased (as structural restrictions 
were gradually lifted), but at a rather low rate; 
• in countries where some efforts in deregulation took 
place since 1985, in particular regarding fees and com­
missions, the decline in financial margins is steeper (F, 
B,L); 
3.3.2 Banking profitability 
The overall development in the cost structure of EU banks 
has improved over the past decade. In particular, staff ex­
penses have, in relation to the average balance sheet de­
creased in most countries. The only notable exception to 
this increase in labour productivity has been Italy, where 
relative personnel expenses have even been slightly higher 
than in the early eighties. This exceptional development 
coincides with an above average development in the operat­
ing margin and net provisions of Italian banks: Unlike in 
other large EU banking markets, Italian banking did not ex­
perience at the same time a squeeze of its operating margin, 
nor the need for large provisions for outstanding loans. 
Thus, it seems that the pressure for efficiency gains had 
been lower in Italy. 
Banks' financial margins, as measured as the ratio between 
net interest income and non­bank deposits, overall de­
clined from 1985 to 1993 in the Community (EC­15). In 
Denmark, Portugal and Greece, financial margins in 1993 
were larger than in 1985, however a decreasing trend has 
been observed already since 1991. On the contrary, in Italy 
and Sweden the trend in financial margins from 1985 and 
1993 has been steadily increasing. 
• among those Member States which have started 
deregulating later, Spain, which has undertaken the 
most significant deregulation mainly after 1985 ­1987, 
enjoyed declining margins. In Portugal and Greece 
. margins were equally declining, but only since 1991. 
Finally, in Italy, where some structural deregulation 
was undertaken, margins are still rising and show a high 
discrepancy with the rest of Europe in terms of regula­
tion. 
7 See: Guai, Jordi, Neven, Damien ; Banking; Annex to European Economy ­ Social 
Europe; No. 3, 1993; pp. 151 ff. 
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Overall, as regards financial margins, a certain conver­
gence in the recent years among EC countries took place as 
compared to the 1980s where the variety of regulations was 
wider. The margins of banks in some highly regulated 
markets were at that time substantially above average (F, E, 
B) compared with unregulated markets whereas now these 
large differences have decreased (on average, high finan­
cial margins in 1993 do not go beyond 5%). 
Consolidation within the banking industry has, in most 
countries of the EU increased concentration within bank­
ing. 
Over the same period, financial margins in the US have 
steadily increased from 4.2% in 1985 to 5.2% in 1993, re­
flecting the recovery of the banking sector in this period 
from its deep crisis in the mid eighties. In Japan, margins 
are much lower than in the US and have overall remained at 
the same level around 1.6%. 
3.3.3 Stability and consolidation 
Over the period from 1985 to present, concentration has 
overall only little changed (see table 8). Whereas in some, 
formerly more regulated and state-owned markets, con­
centration fell over the period (Greece, France, Portugal), it 
increased in particular in Denmark, Spain and the UK. 
Concentration levels are naturally, given the very different 
market sizes, quite dispersed. The market share of the five 
largest banks amounted in 1994 in the Netherlands to 84%, 
Belgium, Spain and Greece around 60%, UK, France and 
Italy around 45 %. It was relatively low in Germany (28%) 
and in particular, given the specific nature of its market, 
Luxembourg (19%). 
TABLE 8 : Concentration in banking 
(measured in terms of market share of largest 5 groups) 
level 1994 
change 85-94 
decrease 
little / no change D, L 
increase 
medium 
EL, F, Ρ 
I 
Β, E, UK 
high 
NL 
DK 
Source : Economic Research Europe Ltd. 
Most of the changes in market concentration were due to 
external corporate growth by means of mergers and ac­
quisitions of and between banks in the respective country. 
The overall volume and time profile of M&A in the differ­
ent countries is quite different, following more specific cir­
cumstances in the respective country (profitability, degree 
of state ownership and privatization,... ) than an overriding 
pan-European pattern (see table 9). 
Unlike in the US in the 80's or in Scandinavian countries at 
the beginning of the 90's, the EU banking system has dem­
onstrated its resilience to external shocks and rapid asset 
price changes. 
TABLE 9 : Mergers and acquisition in banking 
(in percent of M&A in all industries) 
Β 
D 
E 
F 
I 
NL 
FIN 
S 
UK 
USA 
Japan 
1989-90 
0.2 
4.5 
18.5 
5.1 
22.7 
56.3 
13.9 
8.8 
2.6 
7.3 
71.8 
1991-92 
14.1 
6.5 
13.5 
4.3 
15.6 
0.2 
22.3 
3.8 
6.5 
18.7 
0.3 
1993-94 
7.0 
7.6 
21.5 
1.0 
17.7 
0.5 
21.7 
2.0 
3.4 
9.0 
18.8 
1995-96 
7.9 
3.5 
34.1 
10.4 
19.7 
9.5 
11.3 
0.4 
12.4 
13.5 
77.0 
Source : BIS, Annual Report 1996. 
Essentially only very few banking failures took place since 
1985: 
• the Bank of Commerce and Credit International 
(BCCI), the largest bank in Luxembourg, collapsed in 
July 1991. It was closed down by regulators; 
• the Spanish Banesto had an acute liquidity crisis in 
1994. It was saved by the Spanish deposit insurance 
scheme, and later sold to another Spanish bank. 
• the UK bank Baring's collapsed in February 1995 over 
uncovered losses in stock options traded in Singapore; it 
was subsequently taken over by the Dutch ING. 
None of these failures had any serious repercussion on 
other financial institutions. Thus the feared systemic risk 
inherent in the banking sector, did not materialize even in 
these few large banking failures in the Community over the 
past few years. 
To this result contributed a number of factors, among which 
the overall stability of the general economies, the efficient 
prudential supervision, the quality of banking management 
and the improved capital base which has increased over the 
last decade. In international standards, though, the EU 
banks' capital base is not exceptionally high. Whereas, as 
regards the largest 500 banks world-wide, EU banks ac­
counted roe 43% of all assets, they only accounted for 37% 
of tier one capital8. 
3.3.4 Payments system 
Tremendous efforts have been made over the past decade to 
enhance the domestic payments systems. Efficiency has 
been strengthened by switching gradually from paper-
based to paperless means of payments. The value of paper­
less transactions (credit transfers or direct debits) in the EU 
amounted in 1995 to around 60% of total transactions, up 
from 34% in 1988. However, there are still considerable 
differences among Member States. Belgium, Ireland, and 
Portugal rely still to a large degree on paperbased transac­
tions. In many other Member States, the value of paper-
8 See: The Banker, July 1997. 
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based transactions has fallen below 10% and is falling 
further. 
The stability of the payments system has been enhanced by 
the progress in the introduction of Real­time gross settle­
ment systems (RTGS). Such systems allow the reduction 
and virtual elimination of time lag between a payment order 
and the final settlement of the order, and thus an important 
source of possible credit risk which might spread over, af­
fecting other institutions participating in the payments sys­
tem9. Most Member States have now such a system in oper­
ation, whereas in 1985 only the UK, with its CHAPS 
system, had such a system. Recent introductions took place 
in Belgium in 1996, the ELLIPS system, or Italy, the BI­
REG system in 1997. 
Furthermore Member States decided that all Member 
States such have such a system, and that these systems 
should be linked by the TARGET system. Such Commun­
ity­wide introduction ofthat type if system, and the linking 
of these systems will additionally reduce the systemic risk 
in the payment system of Member States. 
3.4 Securities markets 
3.4.1 Stock markets 
Total market capitalization of EU stock markets amounts to 
22% of total international stock market capitalization. As 
an EU average this amounts to 32% of total GDP, as com­
pared to 68% in the US and 65% in Japan. 
However, within the Community differences are consider­
able (see table 10): the largest stock market by far, 
measured in terms of market capitalization, in absolute and 
relative terms, is the UK, followed by, in relative terms, the 
Netherlands. Relatively small are the market capitalization 
in Greece, Italy and Austria. Differences in trading vol 
TABLE 10 
B 
DK 
D 
EL 
E 
F 
IRL 
I 
L 
NL 
A 
Ρ 
FIN 
S 
UK 
Stock markets' size ­
market 
capitalization 
in % of GDP 
45.9 
41.8 
29.6 
19.7 
42.3 
38.9 
49.7 
21.7 
193.4 
97.8 
14.3 
23.7 
50.7 
97.2 
149.9 
EU 53.0 
Source : Federation of European Stock Ex 
­domestic equity (1996) 
trading 
volume in % 
of market 
capitalization 
18.6 
50.8 
112.3 
34.3 
97.9 
163.4 
17.0 
39.9 
2.3 
49.4 
32.1 
28.7 
35.5 
53.5 
44.1 
72.6 
trading 
volume in % 
ofGDP 
changes, own calculations. 
8.6 
21.2 
33.3 
6.7 
41.4 
63.5 
8.5 
8.6 
4.5 
48.3 
4.6 
6.8 
18.0 
52.0 
66.1 
38.5 
See the report of the BIS: Real Time Gross Settlement Systems, 1997. 
umes are even larger among Member States. Whereas the 
markets in Luxembourg, Ireland, Belgium and Portugal 
have shown a turnover in 1996 of less than 30% of the do­
mestic market capitalization. On the other end, German, 
French and Spanish markets have proven to be highly 
liquid. 
Within the last 5 years, stock markets have, measured in 
capitalization and number of quoted companies, increased 
their role in the Netherlands, France, and Greece, and de­
creased in Belgium and the UK. However, liquidity in these 
markets very often differs sharply from the size of tradable 
assets. In 1996 the German and UK exchanges accounted 
for more than 76% of all equity market turnover in domestic 
companies in the Community. Within the last 5 years an in­
crease in trading activity of about 50% took place in the 
Community. However in the same period for Belgium,Tre­
land, and Italy this number dropped whereas in other 
markets (Germany, Greece, Denmark, Portugal, France) 
the increase was above the EU average. 
However, to a large extent, stock markets do not serve as an 
alternative to financial intermediation but just as a supple­
ment, as it is to a certain degree financial services com­
panies which tap the stock märkets (e. g. as a percentage of 
total capitalization in Portugal 73%, and in Italy 67%). 
There is a negative correlation between the size of the over­
all stock market and the share of financial firms. In other 
words, the absolute figures even underestimate the differ­
ent degrees of stock market financing of non­financial 
companies. 
Member States' organized stock markets mostly trade do­
mestic equity only. Financial integration has not changed 
this type of segmentation. Only London has a sizeable 
amount of trading in foreign shares (around 2/3 of total 
trading in London, around 95% of total EU trading in 
foreign shares), far ahead of German (where a very large 
number of foreign shares is listed but in which trading is 
quite thin) and French markets. 
Apart from the London SEAQ, most EU stock markets still 
basically trade domestic securities. Nevertheless, financial 
integration has over the past years translated into a closer 
interrelation of national stock markets. Cross­border secu­
rities transactions have very strongly increased and port­
folios in particular of institutional investors have become 
more international. 
This closer integration has translated into a higher correla­
tion of national stock market prices. As table 11 shows, a 
simple comparison of the period 1991­1996 with 
1985­1990 shows the increasing correlation between EU 
markets. For example, the correlation between the German 
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TABLE ll :Change in correlation of share prices 
(correlation of monthly values of national share price indices, change in period 1991-96 over period 1985-90 in 
K DK D E I NI. FIN 
h points) 
UK 
B 
DK 
D 
E 
I 
N 
Fl 
S 
U 
USA 
0 
0.62 
0.02 
0.13 
0.75 
0.37 
0.36 
0.17 
0 
13 
35 
04 
08 
-0.32 
USA 
0.42 
0.01 
-0.02 
0.13 
0.01 
-0.02 
0 
-0.05 
0 
0.23 
0.58 
0.3 
0.19 
0.5 
0.24 
0.34 
0.23 
L 
IN 
K 
0.20 
-0.06 
0.03 
-0.04 
-0.1  
0.
0.
-0.
0 
0.33 
0.11 
0.13 
0 
0.10 
0.11 
0 
0.11 
.  
.  
.  
.  
-0.10 0.08 0.05 
0 
0.03 
-0.03 
0 
-0.03 
Source : Eurostat; own calculations. 
and Dutch markets has increased by 0.13 points. Overall, 
the correlation has increased over this period within the EU, 
whereas the corresponding correlation of Member States' 
markets with major third markets, such as the US, has vir­
tually remained the same in these two periods (see 
table 11). 
3.4.2 Bond markets 
EU bond markets account for about 32% of all outstanding 
bonds world-wide10. However within the Community 
there are large differences in the absolute and relative size 
of the respective bond markets (see table 12). 
The largest EU bond markets are by far the German and 
Italian ones with together nearly half of all EU outstanding 
TABLE 12 : Bond markets ' size 
(all domesticfixed income securities, 1996) 
Β 
DK 
D 
EL 
E 
F 
IRL 
I 
L 
NL 
A 
Ρ 
FIN 
S 
UK 
EU 
US 
JAP 
Source 
private 
sector 
165.3 
222.3 
1301.0 
1.0 
54.7 
697.7 
2.0 
520.6 
13.7 
85.2 
89.3 
23.6 
41.8 
199.9 
328.4 
3747.0 
5730.3 
1865.4 
Bn. ECU 
public 
sector 
34S.4 
143.2 
1083.9 
125.3 
377.8 
875.9 
36.8 
1622.5 
1.3 
253.1 
93.3 
57.8 
64.9 
181.2 
593.4 
5858.6 
9017.7 
4188.9 
BIS, own calculations. 
total 
514.2 
365.6 
2384.8 
126.3 
432.5 
1573.6 
38.9 
2143.1 
15.0 
338.3 
182.6 
81.4 
106.7 
381.1 
921.7 
9605.6 
14748.1 
6054.3 
private 
sector 
49.3 
100.4 
43.5 
0.7 
7.3 
35.6 
2.3 
33.8 
61.6 
17.1 
31.9 
17.9 
26.7 
62.9 
22.6 
34.4 
62.1 
32.0 
% of GDP 
public 
sector 
103.7 
64.7 
36.3 
80.3 
50.6 
44.6 
41.3 
105.2 
5.7 
50.8 
33.3 
43.8 
41.4 
57.0 
40.8 
53.7 
97.8 
71.9 
total 
153.0 
165.1 
79.8 
81.0 
58.0 
80.2 
43.6 
139.0 
67.3 
67.8 
65.2 
61.7 
68.1 
119.1 
63.4 
88.1 
159.9 
103.9 
bonds. As regards bond markets for private issuers, in most 
of the EU Member States bond markets do not provide a 
feasible alternative for company funding. Germany has, in 
absolute numbers, the largest private sector bond market, 
mostly driven by mortgage-backed or other bank bonds. 
As compared to the size of the economy, Denmark, Sweden 
and Germany have relatively large market. The main is­
suers on the markets are either governments or financial in­
stitutions. Other corporate bonds are, with the exception of 
France, the Netherlands and Spain, almost non-existent. 
Public sector bond markets are, in relative terms, particu­
larly dominating in Italy, Belgium and Greece. 
Certain instruments on the bond markets are not yet devel­
oped. This applies in particular to indexed bonds11. 
Government bond markets, as the largest and most liquid 
segment, have become the main target for cross-border ac­
quisitions of securities, in particular reinforced by the in­
creased activity of institutional investors. Table 13 might 
give an indication of the state of this trend. 
Two cases, Italy and Portugal clearly buck the trend, as they 
show either a continuously very low level of foreign in-
TABLE 13 : Gross general government debt held by 
non-residents 
(% of outstanding debt at year end) 
1987 1993 change 
Β 
DK 
D 
EL 
E 
F 
IRL 
I 
NL 
Ρ 
UK 
16 
36 
21 
34 
3 
3 
48 
4 
9 
23 
13 
20 
51 
34 
26 
31 
56 
2 
16 
15 
15 
ν 
ν 
ν 
Source : EMI Public Finance Report, 5/1994. 
10 Salomon Brothers; "How big is the World Bond Market?"; September 1993. 
11 See e. g. for the discussion of these instruments: Viard, Alan; The Welfare Gain from 
the Introduction of Indexed Bonds; JMCB; Vol. 25(3): p. 613-29. 
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volvement or a significantly dropping foreign ownership. 
Both cases can be mostly explained by the respective tax 
system, which imposes or imposed withholding taxes on 
the bond yields of these securities also to non-residents, 
and thus had a structural competitive disadvantage as com-
pared to most other markets where such a taxation on non-
residents does not exist (see the chapter on tax issues related 
to capital movements). 
3.4.3 Derivatives markets 
One of the major features of European fixed-income 
markets is the high and increasing presence of institutional 
investors and their interest in easily hedging their bond 
portfolio against interest rate changes. Thus, the attractive-
ness of a bond market is increasingly linked to the existence 
of an efficient market for interest rate derivatives. Conse-
quently, organized derivatives' markets are mainly driven 
by contracts on fixed-income claims (see table 14). 
GRAPH 18 : Financial Derivatives 
notional amount outstanding on organized exchanges 
(year end) 
USD Trillion 
TABLE 14 : Derivative financial instruments traded on 
organized markets 
Notional principal amount outstanding (Bn. USD, 31/31997) 
total of which in 
Europe 
Interest rate futures 
Interest rate options 
Currency futures 
Currency options 
Equity index futures 
Equity index options 
6529.1 
3776.9 
50.7 
52.3 
214.7 
422.7 
182 
111 
0.8 
1.1 
61. 
134 
Source : BIS. 
At present liquid interest derivatives markets exist for the 
currencies of several Member States (Germany, Spain, 
France, UK). In the case of DM contracts two major 
markets (LLFFE, DTB) compete for business; whereas in 
the other cases one, domestic, market only exists. For a few 
other currencies (ITL, HFL, BEF) derivatives are traded, 
but the volume is relatively minor. For currencies closely 
linked to DM the DM derivatives market serves as the more 
liquid alternative for derivatives transactions, leaving just a 
relatively minor risk of unparalleled movements between 
the two different interest rates (base risk) All these markets 
have been started within the last 5 years at most, thus sig-
nificantly later than the US markets where financial futures 
were first introduced in the late seventies. Initially long-
term contracts were developed and introduced; more re-
cently short-term contracts (typically three-months-con-
tracts) were launched and are in large demand. LIFFE is the 
largest derivatives exchange in the Community, and the 
only one with significant business in derivatives on foreign 
securities or indices. In 1996 around 168 Mio. contracts 
were traded on its floor (after just 39 Mio. contracts in 
1991), of which around 53% were in DM interest rate con-
tracts. 
Thus growth of financial derivatives has been in the past 
few years particularly strong in Europe (see chart 18), 
where for a long time the development was considerably 
lagging behind the US. However this gap is about to be 
closed. 
The systemic risk associated with these markets has proven 
to be small, as efficient clearing houses guarantee settle-
ment and delivery on all these markets. 
No increase in the interest rate volatility following the intro-
duction of such markets within the EU could be discovered. 
Nor do those bond markets with liquid derivatives markets 
exhibit higher interest rate volatilities than those without. 
History teaches, if at all; the reverse causality: high interest 
rate volatility, caused by monetary policy or external eco-
nomic shocks, created the demand for derivatives, in order 
to allow economic agents to hedge against sudden interest 
rate changes, or to take speculative positions. Stock market 
derivatives play, as compared to interest rate products, a 
minor role on the derivatives exchanges. 
The weight of exchange rate derivatives is even smaller, as 
the major market activity in this field is confined to the un-
organized interbank market. Trades on this market are not 
reported on a regular basis; only a survey carried out by the 
BIS in 1992 casts some light on the size and structure of this 
market. 
No trading supervision, as for regular exchanges, exists for 
these interbank exchange market. The only supervisory 
rules apply to capital adequacy standards in relation to open 
currency positions. As there is no central clearing institu-
tion acting on this market, open positions between the par-
ticipating commercial banks are not netted against each 
other. Thus possible repercussions from the failure of one 
bank to meet its obligations subsequently on other banks 
(systemic risk) is amplified. 
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Box 2: The role of derivatives in financial intermediation 
Initially, financial derivatives markets were amarket-
dri ven answer to volatility in interest rates stemming 
from increased inflationary expectations and "vol-
atile" monetary policy in some major Western econ-
omies. They were conceived, basically, as a hedging 
instrument for long term investors. A consequence of 
this situation is that at present the major financial de-
rivatives products are interest rate related products in 
order to allow big institutional investors to hedge the 
interest rate risk of their portfolios, who are to a large 
extent concentrated in bonds. 
In today's capital markets both the cash and the de-
rivatives markets form a single entity. Both are differ-
ent methods of dealing with the same financial instru-
ment and, thus, they move together in the same direc-
tion. This result is assured by arbitrageurs, which 
equalize prices between both markets. 
At the beginning of their development, derivatives 
markets followed cash markets in their movements, 
as the former were simply hedging tools. However, 
nowadays, derivatives markets tend to become the 
primary market place where the "discovery price" ac-
tivity is carried out, sending messages to cash 
markets, which tend to follow. 
Several competitive advantages of derivatives 
markets over cash markets have contributed to this 
role reversal: 
1. Some of the products, traded on the derivatives 
markets, are "ideal-type" of assets, such as certain 
notional bonds or stock indices. These assets allow 
asset managers to precisely adjust their portfolios to 
their specific needs. Cash markets provide only ap-
proximations to these contracts. 
2. Transaction costs are lower, as the delivery and 
settlement of the security as such is not necessary. 
3. They allow investors to leverage their positions 
very flexibly without having to borrow from credit 
institutions. 
4. They are a flexible tool for investors to quickly real-
locate their funds between different financial in-
struments within their portfolios. 
Because of these factors "marginal" transactions are 
basically made in the derivatives markets, which form 
the critical mass in the process of price formation. 
The facilities given to investors by derivatives 
markets for a quick and efficient reallocation in their 
portfolios and in taking fresh positions, coupled with 
their linkage with the underlying cash markets, have 
the effect of improving the transmission and discount-
ing of any piece of news into market prices and, thus 
the efficiency of markets to incorporate all informa-
tion available. 
Derivatives markets have also an important impact in 
improving the liquidity of underlying cash markets, 
not only via arbitrage activities, but also by the fact 
that derivatives markets allow investors to hedge their 
positions in the underlying markets and, thus, the 
possibility of reducing market risks, which is a power-
ful incentive for big institutional investors. Highly 
liquid markets have a positive impact on funding 
costs in the underlying markets, since the risk pre-
mium tends to be lower than in markets with lower li-
quidity. 
Finally, evidence shows that derivatives markets do 
not increase the price volatility in the underlying cash 
markets. Volatility in those financial centres with 
relatively well developed derivatives markets does 
not seem to have substantially increased over recent 
years and, what is more important, it is lower than in 
other markets with no significant derivatives markets 
activity. 
3.4.4 Foreign exchange markets 
Foreign exchange markets have world-wide grown very 
rapidly in the past few years, and are mostly in the form of 
interbank over-the counter markets. According to the last 
triennial BIS survey on this issue, the total daily volume 
amounted in April 1995 to around 1136 Bn USD. 
During that period EU markets amounted to around 50% of 
global markets, up from 48.6% in 1992 (see table 15). The 
UK is the dominant market place for foreign exchange turn-
over, with around 29.5% of the global and 58.6% of total 
EU foreign exchange business, far ahead of Germany and 
France. The US dollar remains the most heavily traded 
currency on these international markets, far ahead of Ger-
many and France within the EU. 
The USD has remained the main traded currencies, repre-
senting around 83% of total volume of 200% for both sides. 
EU, including the ECU, amounted to 69%. Thus, the pre-
dominance of EU markets for foreign exchange trading 
does not necessarily translate in a similar dominance of EU 
currencies in international trading. Here the USD has 
maintained its position, amounting to more than all EU cur-
rencies combined. 
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TABLE 15 : Foreign exchange turnover; April 1995 
Countries % of total 
Β 1.8 
DK 1.9 
D 4.9 
EL 0.2 
E 1.2 
F 3.7 
URL 0.3 
I 1.5 
L 1.2 
Currencies 
DM 
FF 
GBP 
other EMS curr. 
ECU 
total EU curr. 
USD 
Yen 
total 
% of total 
36.1 
7.9 
9.4 
13.5 
2.2 
69.1 
83.3 
24.11 
200* 
NL 1.6 
A 0.9 
Ρ 0.2 
FIN 0.3 
S 1.3 
UK 29.5 
EU 50.4 
US 15.5 
Japan 10.3 
total 100 
*the total is 200% due to the double counting. 
Source : BIS, own calculations. 
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GRAPH 19b : Life insurance penetration and GDP in 1995 
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3.5 Insurance industry 
Financial intermediation via insurance has steadily in­
creased over the past decade. The growth has been particu­
larly remarkable in the field of life insurance, and there par­
ticularly in countries which were still lagging behind the 
Community average in 1985. 
The impact of life insurance on financial intermediation 
typically depends on the general level of GDP in the re­
spective country. However, the correlation between the 
ratio of premiums over GDP, and GDP per capita steadily 
weakened over the period 1985­1994. In 1985 a rather 
strong correlation can be observed between the two vari­
ables (R2 of 0.65), disregarding the cases of the UK and Ire­
land which have a very different pattern compared with the 
rest of the countries under analysis. In 1993 (see graph) the 
correlation has strongly diminished (R2 of 0.14). This 
shows that in a more deregulated environment life insur­
ance depends more strongly upon other factors than the 
GDP. 
The penetration ratios (premiums over GDP) of life and 
non­life insurance generally increased across Europe (the 
majority of dots are above the dividing 45° line), except for 
Finland which has experienced a deep fall in its premium 
income from 1990 to 1993, and Ireland which has however 
more or less remained at its 1985 level in the case of life in­
surance. This means that overall the relative importance of 
the insurance industry in the domestic GDP has increased in 
Europe between 1985 and 1993. 
Greece, Portugal, Spain and Italy show a relatively low 
penetration and therefore a below average development of 
the insurance sector, whereas in the UK and Ireland, insur­
ance plays a much larger role than in Community average. 
Life insurance penetration has increased most between 
1985 and 1993 in the UK, France, the Netherlands, Spain, 
and Portugal. For non­life the same countries, except 
France, are equally the ones with the most dynamic devel­
opment in this period. 
In US and Japan, the picture is similar. In US, the penetra­
tion of life insurance remained the same from 1985 to 1993 
(around 3.9 ­ 4%), whereas the penetration of non­life in­
surance increased by 75% (from 3.6% in 1985 to 6.2% in 
1994). In Japan, penetration in life insurance increased by 
33% from 1985 to 1994 (from 4.9% to 6.5%) and penetra­
tion in non­life insurance by more than 50% (from 1.4% to 
2.17%). 
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Productivity in the insurance sector, as measured as the 
ratio of total gross premiums over the number of employees 
of the insurance companies, increased across Europe from 
1989 to 1995 by around 30%. This increase has been par­
ticularly strong in Germany, Belgium and France, whereas 
in particular Ireland and Spain have not registered any sig­
nificant increase over that period. Over a longer period, 
starting from 1985, the overall nominal increase was slight­
ly lower than the one in Japan but much higher than in the 
US. France, Italy and Spain have experienced a major rise 
in productivity, followed by the UK, Denmark, Luxem­
bourg, Belgium, and Ireland. Only the Finnish insurance 
sector productivity has diminished from 1985 to 1994 (due 
to the sharp fall ofGDP in the 1990s). In this period produc­
tivity levels among Member States showed a trend of 
further divergence; in 1985, the productivity levels were 
much more similar than in 1993. 
TABLE 16 : Gross Profitability of the insurance sector 
(in percent of total premiums) 
Gross Gross operating Profits 
benefits costs 
Β 64.4 
DK 73.4 
D 69.1 
E 69.0 
IRL 81.0 
I 80.2 
L 70.6 
NL 73.6 
A 67.6 
Ρ 69.1 
FIN 80.9 
S 85.1 
40.0 
20.0 
21.3 
31.0 
33.2 
17.9 
18.9 
17.2 
23.1 
27.4 
26.7 
19.0 
26.4 
­AA 
6.6 
9.6 
0.1 
1.1 
0.9 
12.2 
3.8 
5.0 
4.3 
0.1 
­11.4 
Source : Eurostat; no data available for Greece and the UK. 
GRAPH 20 : Insurance sector productivity 
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3.6 The role of institutional investors 
One major trend on the European financial markets is the 
growing importance of institutional investors (insurance, 
mutual funds, pension funds). Their increasing role is 
fuelled by several factors: 
the increased wealth of private households, which 
seeks diversification out of the classical saving book 
assets; 
an increased complexity on the markets creates house­
hold demand for such investment via institutions. 
Furthermore, the specific demographic situation in 
Europe, in particular, the expected sharp increase of the 
aged and the resulting expected shortfalls in public 
pension plans creates a particular demand. 
GRAPH 21 : Financial assets of institutional investors 
(in % of GDP) 
Overall, EU Member States with the highest productivity in 
1985 were Finland, Denmark, Ireland, and Italy; in 1994 
France and Italy. The lowest productivity in 1985 was reg­
istered in Portugal, whereas in 1994 Greece was at the bot­
tom of this list. 
Productivity does not necessarily translate into correspon­
ding profitability. Relative wages for insurance employees 
and other costs lead to above average costs in France and 
Belgium. Benefit payments are particularly high in 
Sweden, Ireland, Finland and Italy. Therefore, gross 
profits(without investment income) were negative in 
Sweden, France, and Belgium, and very high in Luxem­
bourg and Germany (see table 16). 
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In some countries institutional saving has reached a very 
high proportion of household financial assets. In the 
Netherlands, for example, such institutional savings have 
reached around 94% of total household saving in 1994, up 
from 87% in 1985. 
Most of the very large institutional investors in the Com-
munity are either banks, mutual funds, or life insurance 
companies from the big Member States (see table 17). 
Among Member States, pension funds play a significant 
role only in the UK, the Netherlands and Ireland (as it is the 
case in the US). This is partly due to the predominance in 
other Member States of pay as you go statutory systems or 
supplementary schemes, or of book reserve schemes such 
as those prevalent in Germany. 
TABLE 17 : Largest EU institutional investors 
(Assets under management in Bn. US-$, end 1995) 
Institution 
1. BZW Asset Management 
2. Groupe Axa 
3. Deutsche Bank 
4. Dresdner Bank 
5. Allianz 
6. Groupe Caisse des Dépôts 
7. Algem. Burgelijk Pensioensfonds 
8. Union des Assurances de Paris 
9. ING Group 
10. Mercury Asset Management 
home country 
UK 
F 
D 
D 
D 
F 
NL 
F 
NL 
UK 
assets 
844.3 
275.0 
212.1 
178.5 
171.2 
166.3 
141.0 
136.0 
129.9 
119.0 
Source : Euromoney 
3.7 Cross-border access to financial services 
Trade barriers faced in EU banking and credit markets have 
been largely reduced since the completion of the SMP, al-
though various restrictions still persist. The corporate cus-
tomer market has witnessed the most significant reduction 
in barriers relative to the retail sector. Reductions in 
barriers appear to have been most pronounced in Italy and 
Portugal. 
There is a broad consensus across member states concern-
ing the relative importance of the barriers that respondents 
face when operating in other EU markets. The financial and 
informational cost of entering new geographical markets 
are by far the most significant barriers that financial institu-
tions face. Various legal hindrances (such as restrictions on 
marketing financial services) and national taxation regimes 
are also viewed as substantial barriers. 
3.7.1 Deposit and loan prices and fee levels 
Competition intensified in all EU banking and credit 
markets in the post-SMP period and this has been reflected 
by a decrease in financial service prices in various market 
segments across countries. Case study and questionnaire 
evidence suggested that the SMP has been largely respon-
sible for reported loan and deposit price reductions in 
Greece, Italy and Spain, whereas in other EU systems the 
internal market integration programme has had a smaller 
influence. 
The price of corporate loans to both small and large firms in 
all countries fell slightly, except in Ireland, France and 
Spain where relatively large decreases were reported. 
Banks in Greece and Denmark also indicated relatively 
large price decreases for corporate loans to large firms. The 
price of retail loans and mortgages also fell slightly across 
the EU, although the price falls were smaller than in the cor-
porate sector. 
Deposit prices in the retail and corporate sectors decreased 
slightly during the post-SMP period and some 14% of re-
spondents attributed this decline largely to the SMP while 
two thirds claimed the SMP was slightly responsible for the 
decrease. 
Fee levels have fallen by a very small amount during the 
post-SMP period. Banks in Spain, Portugal and Greece at-
tribute relatively large proportions of this fall to the SMP. 
In a replication of the price differential analysis found in the 
Cecchini report, significant price differences are found to 
remain across countries. Credit card prices, however, have 
fallen (by comparison with Cecchini) across all EU systems 
and the range of prices has narrowed by about 30 per cent. 
The range of mortgage prices between member states has 
also narrowed, although as the price of mortgages has not 
decreased across-the-board it is not possible to say 
whether this convergence is towards a lower average price. 
For commercial loans, current cheque accounts and per-
sonal equity transaction costs, substantial price differences 
across countries persist. Moreover, in 1994 differences of 
over 100 per cent remained for the cost to consumers of 
cross-border payment transfers. 
3.7.2 The impact of the SMP on consumers 
There is no strong evidence that, in response to the SMP, 
banks have changed their strategies in ways that threaten 
the stability of banking systems in the EU. This partly re-
flects the need for banks in a number of EU countries to 
meet more demanding prudential requirements, but also re-
flects increased concern by banks to earn an adequate return 
on equity. Consumers are benefiting from a wider range of 
financial products and services as a result of SMP and new 
channels of delivery have opened up (direct banking) as in-
i n ­
creased competition puts pressure on banks to contain and 
reduce costs. 
3.7.3 Internationalization of financial services 
Trade in financial services had increased across a range of 
financial markets post­SMP. The greatest increases were 
in off­balance sheet activities, investment management 
and in the corporate loan segments. Trade at the retail end 
of the market increased only slightly. 
Cross­border provision of financial services, liberalized 
between 1989 and 1996 has strongly increased since the 
mid eighties. Overall intra­EU trade in financial services 
has outpaced the corresponding trade relations with third 
countries, reflecting the establishment of the single finan­
cial market over that period. The intra­EU trade in banking 
was in 1995 more than 2.5 times higher than in 1986 and 
more than twice the amount in insurance. 
Trade in financial services with third countries has been 
marked, both in banking and in insurance, by a much 
stronger increase in imports over that period than exports to 
third countries. This reflects both the attractiveness of the 
single market for foreign financial undertakings, as well as 
continuing regulatory barriers to cross­border trade in ser­
vices in other countries, whereas the EU is practically open 
to third country service providers. However, the EU main­
tained its net export position in financial services. Whereas 
in insurance, this net position fell over the respective 
period, and was even for one year negative, the according 
values for banking and other financial services show an 
even further increase of the EU net exports to third 
countries. 
GRAPH 22 : EU* trade financial services 
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The SMP also appears to have had a marked impact on the 
establishment of cross­border branches, as illustrated by a 
58% increase in such activity in the three years after 1992. 
In addition, the Commission has received from 11 EU 
member states 43 notifications of establishment or acquisi­
tion of subsidiaries as credit institutions (from third 
countries) during the first three years of the internal market. 
Cross­border acquisitions increased sharply in the second 
half of the 1980s and there is a strong presumption that the 
SMP was the major influence. In addition cross­border 
joint ventures and strategic alliances also increased sharply 
over the period. In terms of absolute numbers of mergers 
and acquisitions non­domestic deals the main bidding 
countries are France, the United Kingdom and Italy, with 
the main target countries being France, Italy and Spain, 
confirming predictions (at least for F and E) for countries 
where deregulation has occurred on a relatively large scale. 
Approximately 70% of acquisitions are of an intra­industry 
nature with banks acquiring other financial intermediaries. 
Financial markets and financial services in the Member 
States have after the abolition of legal obstacles, empha­
sized integration and gaining cross­border access. The 
cross­border merger and acquisition strategy in the finan­
cial sector (including insurance) activity has, in the mid to 
late eighties, soared to very high levels. Although such 
activities between Community institutions and those of 
third countries have also grown sharply since then, it was 
mostly intra­EU activity which expanded most. This activ­
ity should, although only gradually, have a major impact on 
the efficiency of Member States' financial institutions and 
financial markets. 
Looking at the profitability of the sector, the decline in in­
terest margins has not been compensated for by efforts to 
boost non­interest income or reduce costs, with the result 
that even though profitability has not declined in absolute 
value over the 1980s, it has not benefited from the general 
recovery of returns observed in European non­financial in­
stitutions. Accordingly returns in banking to invested capi­
GRAPH 23 : FDI in banking and insurance (by country of origin) 
■ 1994 □ 1993 ■ 1992 
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tal have converged to economy­wide returns. These devel­
opments suggest that even in advance of the internal 
market, the benefits, in terms of lower financing costs of in­
vestment have been feeding through to European industry. 
As regards the insurance sector, the supply of insurance 
within Europe had traditionally been dominated by do­
mestically owned insurance companies. One reason for 
this is that many insurance contracts are comparatively 
standardized products, particularly non­life insurance, and 
so the opportunity for product differentiation is difficult. 
Moreover, regulation in some EU countries has tended to 
slow down product innovation. There have been efforts 
since the mid­1980s for a change in the situation for intro­
ducing new information technologies and for the entry of 
foreign insurance companies into local markets, but their 
share has remained rather low. Charts 24 and 25 show the 
development between 1985 and 1995 which shows a de­
cline of market share of foreign branches all over Europe. 
Probably either the market shares of foreign companies de­
creased or there was a merger/acquisition with a domestic 
insurance firm implying that foreign shares became domes­
tic. During the last decade there has been a significant re­
duction in the number of independently controlled com­
panies in the insurance market. Experience in many 
insurance markets shows that internal growth of companies 
does not change much market shares over time. Therefore 
an insurance company can significantly raise its market 
share only by means of acquisition of other insurance com­
panies. 
In life insurance, in Ireland, Portugal and Spain market 
shares of foreign branches and agencies in the life insurance 
market fell particularly strongly, whereas Greece and Aus­
tria are the only countries with rising foreign share over the 
same period. Greece, Ireland and Portugal were in 1995 
countries with relatively high foreign presence, whereas 
Austria, Italy, Denmark and France were considerably 
below average. 
However, it should be noted, that these figures do not in­
clude market shares of domestic, but foreign­controlled in­
surance companies. If these were included the combined 
market share would be much larger. For only few countries 
figures for this "total" foreign market share exist. They 
range, for 1995 in life insurance, between 35% (Austria), 
and 22% (Netherlands) down to 9% (Germany). In non­
life insurance, these "total" foreign shares are, in those 
countries for which data exist, in most cases even higher. 
Furthermore, these total figures remained relatively con­
stant over the 1985­1995 period. It can therefore be as­
sumed that some of the former branches or agencies were in 
that period transformed into domestically incorporated 
companies, thereby "reducing" the market share of foreign 
branches or agencies. 
In the non­life insurance market, the most impressive falls 
in foreign market share are registered in Greece and Bel­
gium, whereas we observe a slight rise in foreign shares in 
Denmark and UK. Presence of foreign companies was in 
1995 relatively high in Ireland and Portugal and relatively 
low in Finland, Austria and Greece. 
In US, between 1988 (first figure available) and 1995, the 
insurance sector has registered a fall of foreign shares in the 
life segment (from 1.62% to 1.2%) and a slight decrease in 
the non­life segment (from 1.2% to 1.1%). In Japan, be­
tween 1985 and 1995, in the life insurance sector foreign 
share increased from 1.1 % to 2.3%, and in the non­life sec­
tor the foreign share decreased from 3.15% to 3.0%. 
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The Commission has adopted on 15 October 1997 a draft 
communication setting out how it proposes to interpret the 
concepts of "freedom to provide services" and "the general 
good" as applied to the insurance sector. These concepts 
are interpreted differently from one Member to another, a 
situation detrimental to the proper functioning of the inter­
nal market in insurance. The draft communication enumer­
ates the circumstances in which a Member may invoke the 
general good in order to justify a set of national rules (re­
quiring, for example, prior notification of policy condi­
tions, certain rating systems, or compulsory excesses in in­
surance contracts) and the criteria on which a line can be 
drawn between business transacted by an insurance com­
pany under the freedom to provide services and that trans­
acted through a branch. The draft communication will 
serve as a basis for a wide- ranging debate between inter­
ested parties, the European and Member States. In the light 
of its findings, the Commission will adopt the final version 
of the interpretative communication. 
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Cross-border mergers and acquisitions in the financial sec­
tor followed in the past years a certain regional pattern12. 
The country of the targeted company tended to be more 
often than suggested by the size of their market, Spain, 
Italy, and Portugal. These companies were consequently 
also much more often acquired by another EU company 
than the reverse, that companies of these countries ex­
panded into other EU Member States. France, Germany, 
and the Netherlands, on the other hand, were the countries 
from which mainly such takeover targets originated. 
GRAPH 25 : Market share of foreign companies (*) 
in domestic non life insurance 
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(*) branches/agencies of foreign undertakings (gross premium basis). 
Source : OECD. 
3.7.4 Internal market integration, market structure 
and concentration 
The SMP has reduced entry barriers enabling banks to com­
pete with a broader range of financial and non-financial 
firms as well as markets. The implementation of the univer­
sal banking model under the Second Banking Directive has 
led to the breakdown in demarcation lines between business 
area and institutions helping to promote bancassurance/ 
allfinanz strategies. Competition on both sides of the bal­
ance sheet, as well as off-balance sheet, has intensified and 
industry restructuring has led, on average, to increased le­
vels of market concentration. In the majority of EU sys­
tems, the level of employment in the banking and credit sec­
tor has fallen post-SMP, reflecting the increased 
competitive environment. 
3.7.5 Economies of scale and costs 
There is a preponderance of scale economies across a broad 
range of bank output in the European banking market. This 
is an important result of the analysis in that it demonstrates a 
"Cross-border alliances in banking and financial services in the single market"; Bank 
of England Quarterly Bulletin, August 1993, pp. 372 - 378. 
potential for cost reductions through increased market size 
that might be brought about by the SMP However, these 
scale economies appear to be soon exhausted through cycli­
cal changes in bank output. There is also evidence from the 
postal survey and case studies that the SMP has extended 
the relevant market size particularly at the wholesale end of 
the market (off-balance sheet activities, fund management, 
investment services and large corporate loans). Given 
these findings it appears that the SMP has led to further real­
ization of economies of scale in these particular market seg­
ments. The econometric results indicate that the greatest 
potential for exploiting scale economies is for smaller 
banks particularly those in Germany and France. 
The SMP has resulted in a decrease in the costs of supplying 
cross-border services with the greatest impact occurring in 
Greece, Portugal and Belgium. However, in all cases the 
impact of the SMP has been small. Bank staff costs per unit 
of output have fallen steadily throughout the 1980s and 
early 1990s but there is no strong evidence of an SMP im­
pact. An SMP effect is equally elusive in the case of non-
staff costs. 
Scope economies are found across the majority of EU bank­
ing markets for only two size categories of banks: those 
with assets size in the range ECU 1 to 10 billion and banks 
larger than ECU 50 billion. Although there is a presump­
tion that the impact of the SMP will be to increase econ­
omies of scope, there is no clear evidence from the econo­
metric estimates to indicate that this has occurred for the 
largest banks across Europe. However, because there is 
evidence that the SMP programme has encouraged product 
innovation and diversification by banking and credit organ­
izations, the identification of economies of scope esta­
blishes a strong presumption of an SMP impact. In addi­
tion, the move towards a universal banking model brought 
about by the SMP further reinforces the view that there has 
been greater opportunities for exploiting economies of 
scope across EU banking markets. 
3.7.6 Revenues and returns 
Although it is problematic to disentangle SMP effects from 
other cyclical, deregulatory and structural developments 
the analysis in this section points to the impact changes in 
cost efficiency and price effects had on the overall revenue 
and return characteristics of EU banking markets. Differ­
ent systems witnessed a broad range of experiences but the 
cost and performance indicators overall, point towards a 
more competitive EU banking environment. Evidence pro­
vided from the case study and questionnaire responses, 
again, reinforce the notion of a heightened competitive 
environment resulting from the reduction of entry barriers 
brought about by the SMP. 
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3.7.7 Strategic reactions of the SMP 3.7.8 The effectiveness of the SMP 
The perception and strategic focus of the European banking 
sector altered rapidly as a consequence of the Single Euro-
pean Act in 1986 and the rapid moves to a single EU bank-
ing market. The Second Banking Directive (1989) and the 
attendant Own Funds and Solvency Ratio Directives gave a 
further impetus to these developments with the latter re-
garded as particularly important by banks. In addition the 
domestic deregulation of interest rate restrictions, capital 
controls, branching restrictions and so on also had the im-
pact of changing the strategic focus of the industry. 
The generalized impact of the SMP forces intensified bank-
ing competition and shifted the strategic focus of banks to-
wards greater competition. Both domestic and cross-bor-
der acquisition business accelerated as did trade in banking 
and credit services. 
The legislation of the SMP is now largely implemented. 
However, despite the success in removing many of the ob-
stacles that existed prior to the SMP and creating a new 
competitive dynamic across EU banking markets, there still 
remain a number of barriers that continue to constrain the 
exploitation of the full benefits of the Single Market. These 
remaining barriers are quite diverse and vary from one EU 
country to the next. Various legal and fiscal (tax) treatment 
barriers still remain. Important barriers also remain relat-
ing to restrictions on marketing activities and the range of 
products that banks can offer outside their territory. In areas 
relating to housing mortgages, access to capital markets, 
differences in the treatment of withholding tax and varying 
subsidy arrangements continue to hinder the creation of a 
true Single European Market. Finally, there is also some 
evidence that the 'general good provision', because of the 
uncertainty which it gives rise to, can create barriers to 
cross-border activity. 
Markets became more international and foreign operators 
established a significant presence in certain systems, es-
pecially at the wholesale end of the corporate banking 
market. As domestic regulations were relaxed or/and abol-
ished, and as EC legislation was implemented, demarcation 
lines between particular business areas were broken down. 
The universal banking model increased its role across EU 
markets, facilitating the development of bancassurance 
business as well as capital markets and other non-main-
stream banking activities. 
The increasingly competitive environment brought about 
by these developments resulted in both defensive and/or 
offensive reactions by banks. Banks in the previously more 
protected markets, such as in Italy, Spain and Portugal, wit-
nessed domestic mergers between large banks in a strategic 
attempt to protect market share from possible foreign com-
petitors. The same can perhaps be said of banks operating 
in the smaller more concentrated EU markets, such as in the 
Netherlands. 
Market positioning, product diversification and innova-
tion, improved efficiency and increased size have all been 
strategically prioritized in the new, more pro-competitive 
banking environment facilitated by the SMP. Profitability 
and efficiency appear to be more important strategically 
than size alone. 
There now exists a much more competitive and market 
driven EU banking system with a greater focus on cost and 
profit efficiency. Banking markets have become more in-
ternational and the traditional banking franchise has broa-
dened so much that, in most countries, it is now unrecognis-
able from what existed in the mid-1980s. 
4. FINANCIAL MARKETS' PERFORMANCE 
4.1 Employment, cost of financial intermediation 
and profitability 
4.1.1 Size of financial intermediation 
The financial markets of the Community increased their 
total transaction volume and outstanding assets consider-
ably and to a larger degree than GDP. With it the cost of fi-
nancial intermediation also grew. From 1985 to 1995 in 
most EU Member States the share of value added in the fi-
nancial sector increased. However, this relative growth 
GRAPH 26 : Growth of financial services in the EU 
(gross value added of banking and insurance; nominal values in 
change in percent over previous year) 
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took mainly place in the 80s. The strong growth of credit 
and other financial services then lowered the cost of in­
termediation subsequently, without fully compensating for 
the cost increases of the first part of the last decade. 
In most of the EU countries financial services amount to 5 
to 5.5% of domestic value added (see chart 27). The very 
high figure for Luxembourg reflects the particular role of 
this country on the Euromarkets. The high and increasing 
figure for Portugal is noteworthy. It might reflect efficiency 
problems following the abolition of credit controls and the 
deregulation of the financial sector in the mid eighties, 
which has not yet led to a major consolidation. 
These figures have to be interpreted carefully, as they partly 
reflect only the change in the yield curve which does not 
necessarily reflect the underlying true costs of financial in­
termediation. They also overlook the increasing export and 
import of financial services. Finally, an increasing part of 
intermediation happens outside the banking sector. Non­
banks, such as large institutional investors or cash­rich cor­
porations, directly channel funds into the market, either 
securitized or not, but in both cases by­passing core finan­
cial institutions. 
GRAPH 27 : Financial services: value added and employment 
(gross value added and employment, in percent of total economy, 
change 1985­1994*) 
gross value added 
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*: employment : NL 1993, B, E: 1992. Source : Eurostat. 
Cross­border payments transactions still face major cost 
obstacles, which makes certain cross­border transactions 
sometimes several times more expensive than domestic 
transactions. This extra cost has two dimensions: the di­
rect, higher, transaction cost, and the often higher counter­
party risk, which constitutes an indirect, and more hidden 
cost to financial intermediation. 
nancial markets. Securities markets are normally organ­
ized in the respective domestic financial centres. Foreign 
investors have to place their orders via their intermediaries, 
which in turn place the order via domestic brokers. Further­
more, settlement and delivery is equally bound to national 
markets. Cross­border delivery is expensive. 
International foreign exchange markets, unorganized inter­
bank markets, do not face high direct costs. However, in 
this field, the counterparty risk, the possibility that the 
counterparty of a mostly forward transaction fails to meet 
its obligation, are relatively high. This is a major difference 
to organized futures and options markets (for interest rate or 
stock market futures and options), where normally a clear­
ing house nets the mutual positions and guarantees settle­
ment and delivery. 
In the field of securities transactions, private organizations 
have started to organize cross­border securities settlement, 
mainly du to the development of the Euromarkets, in a com­
prehensive and efficient way, such as Euroclear or CEDEL. 
National settlement systems, in the past sometimes ham­
pered by national legislation imposing limitations on these 
institutions, have begun to play a role in cross­border 
settlement, often by cooperating with Euroclear and 
CEDEL by means of direct links with these organizations. 
National settlement systems are still, to some degree, sup­
ported by respective national regulations and government 
debt management. 
The share of financial services in the total economy has, in 
terms of gross value added, increased over the 1985­1994 
period in most Member States, quite strongly in the UK and 
Spain, weaker in many other countries and even slightly de­
creased in some Member States (see chart). In employment 
terms, in the same period there has been a trend towards 
similar relative levels, in countries with previously high 
shares of employment in financial services there has been a 
decrease and vice versa. In most member states the respect­
ive share has now attained levels of around 3 to 4 %. 
For cross­border payments equally the appropriate systems 
are missing, apart from certain private sector networks, 
such as SWIFT or the international credit card organiz­
ations. Payment systems are mostly organized on a national 
level by the respective Central Banks, and although very 
efficient, are completely unlinked. The expensive and slow 
method of correspondence banking is still the most frequent 
means of cross­border payments. 
The reason for these higher costs lies in non­integrated 
markets and settlements for certain instruments on the fi­
There is no clear evidence that company profitability and 
thus willingness to invest would have suffered from a finan­
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ciai markets' cost squeeze. Net profitability of capital has 
been over the last 10 years sufficiently higher than real 
long­term interest rates. Furthermore overall company in­
debtedness, in the manufacturing sector, has decreased over 
the 1982 ­ 1991 period, thus reducing the leverage of com­
panies and reducing the potential profit squeeze by finan­
cial market trends. 
However, the situation in the different Member States 
seems to having followed different paths. Profitability 
problems seem to have arisen in particular in Italy and Ire­
land. In both countries the measured real interest rate in­
creased to levels of more than 6 %. In both countries there 
are no sufficient other alternatives for company financing, 
such as liquid stock markets, corporate bond markets or 
commercial paper markets. 
A recent study in the European Economy13 corroborates 
the correlation between credit market imperfections and 
company profits. The development of company profits be­
tween 1982 and 1991 was significantly influenced by the 
rate of company debt, the amount of financial charges and 
industry specific interest rate mark­ups. 
4.1.2 Employment 
Available data show a rather weak, correlation between the 
share of employment in financial services in total economy 
on the one hand and the share of value added in financial 
services in the total economy. This rather counterintuitive 
result might, apart from inherent problems of measuring 
value added in the banking sector, point to very large effi­
ciency differences in the financial sectors of the different 
Member States. 
GRAPH 28 : Financial Services: Employment 
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Employment in the financial services industry has grown 
until the early nineties, but has since then slightly fallen. 
The picture is very mixed in different Member States. In 
Denmark, Italy, Austria, Sweden and the UK, overall em­
ployment grew between 1985 and 1994 whereas in most 
other countries financial services employment fell over that 
period. The general decline in employment from 1991 on 
coincided with a slow down in growth or fall in employ­
ment in the total economy which was even more pro­
nounced than in financial services. Thus, the share of finan­
cial services in total industry has further grown, unlike in 
the US, and has reached a value of nearly 3.4 % as com­
pared to nearly 3.5 % in the US. 
TABLE 18 
Β 
DK 
D 
E 
F 
IRL 
I 
L 
NL 
A 
Ρ 
s 
UK 
USA 
Source 
Wages in financial services 
(wages per employee in financial services 
relative to wages in total economy) 
year 
1992 
1994 
1993 
1992 
1991 
1991 
1994 
1991 
1993 
1994 
1991 
1992 
1994 
1993 
Eurostat; own calculations. 
ratio 
1.42 
1.17 
1.35 
2.02 
1.38 
1.73 
2.21 
1.6 
1.27 
1.01 
2.37 
1.28 
1.59 
1.17 
sector, 
change over 1985 
­0.05 
0.1 
0.08 
0.22 
0.03 
­0.02 
­0.03 
­0.02 
0.08 
­0.02 
0.19 
n.a. 
0.17 
n.a. 
Financial Situation of Industrial Supplement A ­ January 1994. 
At the same time, casual evidence seems to point to a shift in 
financial services towards more highly qualified jobs, re­
flecting the changing structure of financial services and in 
particular the strong impact of advancing information tech­
nology, causing a shift from more simple clerical work to 
more highly qualified jobs in client consulting and manage­
ment and trading. The wage structure might give some 
additional indications to this extent. 
Average wages in the financial services sector are signifi­
cantly higher than on average in the total economy (see 
table 18). In some countries they are more than double the 
amount in the general economy (Spain, Portugal), in most 
cases they are between 20% and 60% higher. Only in Aus­
tria, they are more or less in line with the level in the general 
economy. In most Member States, this gap between wages 
in financial services and in the rest of the economy has 
further increased since 1985, particularly in the UK, in 
Spain and in Portugal, countries, where change and mod­
ernization have particularly fast developed over the past 10 
years. 
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TABLE 19 : Financing structure of EU companies 
(values in percent of total balance sheets (end 1995), and change over 1985 values) 
Creditors : < 
value 
= 1 year of which : 
change value 
from banks Creditors : 
change value 
> 1 year 
change 
Provisions 
value change 
Capital and 
value 
reserves 
change 
small companies 
Austria 
Spain 
France 
Italy 
Netherlands 
Portugal 
Sweden 
average* 
medium-size 
Austria 
Spain 
France 
Italy 
Netherlands 
Portugal 
Sweden 
average* 
i comp: 
large companies 
Austria 
Spain 
France 
Italy 
Netherlands 
Portugal 
Sweden 
average* 
38.6 
41 
44.5 
51.8 
33.5 
44.1 
30.7 
43.8 
mies 
42.2 
36 
47.7 
58.5 
30.2 
34.1 
32.2 
45.8 
-16.3 
-1.8 
-12.2 
-1.9 
-2.3 
-6.5 
-6.9 
-1.1 
10 
4.5 
-8 
4.4 
31.6 
28.9 
30.1 
41.8 
30.4 
19.9 
28.1 
32.8 
* weighted with respective GDP. 
Source : European Commission (BACH 
^1.4 
4 
0.8 
-5.1 
-0.5 
13.3 
12.2 
5.1 
20.2 
4.7 
10 
1.6 
10.4 
14.7 
11.2 
6 
19.8 
7.7 
10.8 
4.5 
11 
-6 
-3.7 
^t.4 
1.9 
-3.1 
-1.8 
-2.1 
-3.6 
-0.2 
1.8 
-2.4 
0.2 
8.2 
5.4 
3.5 
10.5 
5.7 
5.1 
2.8 
6.1 
own calculations). 
0.3 
-3.2 
-0.3 
-1.5 
-0.2 
16.2 
13.1 
18.6 
16.4 
28.5 
21.4 
26.9 
18.6 
18.3 
11.2 
14.9 
11.2 
26 
20.5 
25.4 
33 
18.4 
23.9 
30.3 
18.1 
21.4 
27.6 
18.5 
24 
-2.3 
2.3 
2.2 
4 
8.5 
2.9 
2.2 
-3 
-21 
0 
4.7 
-7.8 
-5.1 
-11.6 
-5 
1.6 
-1.7 
6.6 
1.1 
2 
6 
5.8 
0.3 
6.5 
3.7 
11.8 
2.2 
2.5 
6.1 
5.7 
0.6 
11.9 
4.7 
18.9 
6.2 
14 
9.1 
6.4 
3.4 
18.1 
11.1 
-4.1 
0.5 
-0.5 
1.7 
-0.5 
0.1 
-2.7 
1.3 
-5.4 
0.2 
-0.2 
-2.3 
-1.9 
5.1 
1.9 
0 
0.5 
38.7 
44.6 
34.4 
24.6 
32.1 
27.1 
29.9 
32.8 
27.7 
50.3 
34.1 
23 
38.1 
39.2 
24.3 
15.4 
31.1 
40.7 
23.9 
30.1 
41.8 
41.1 
29.7 
30.7 
22.6 
0.5 
10.3 
-2.6 
-5.8 
3.9 
7.5 
4.3 
17 
-3.3 
3.5 
6.4 
11.4 
4.2 
23.9 
3.6 
3.6 
2.1 
Box 3: SME's competitiveness and cost of capital 
To be competitive, companies as a whole and, in par-
ticular, small and medium enterprises need a financial 
structure healthy enough to overcome periods of crisis. 
Furthermore, profits should remunerate the capital in-
vested as well as the risks taken in order to obtain funds 
for financing the renewal or expansion of its equipment. 
Since 1988 in Europe two facts have hampered ad-
equate financial development of the productive sector: 
• a recourse to higher indebtedness in order to finance 
investments; 
• a tightening of interest rates and consequently of 
the cost of credit up to 1993. 
Bank loan costs affect a company's competitiveness in 
various ways. They have a direct impact on its profit-
and-loss account, in the form of financial costs, and re-
quire the firm to acquire a better return on its assets in 
order to offset the costs of its bank debt. This means that 
a firm will have abetter chance of being competitive in a 
financial environment in which the costs of bank bor-
rowing are not excessively high; in such conditions, it 
will be able to reap the benefits of financial leverage. 
Studies of interest rates and ancillary charges in bank 
lending to small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) 
show that there are considerable differences in the 
cost of credit both between the Member States and 
between the European Union, the United States and 
Japan. 
In the light of the studies' overall findings, the Member 
States can be divided into several groups according to 
the cost of domestic bank lending. 
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Box 3 (continued) 
In an intermediate group Spain, Italy, and Ireland are 
above average and France and Belgium below average. 
The Netherlands, Germany and the UK are, in that 
order, the Member States in which banks generally 
charge firms the lowest rates of interest, fees and com-
missions. 
These differences cannot be attributed to the effect of 
inflation, which reduces the cost of borrowing only 
moderately: interest rate differentials between EC 
Member States are more pronounced than the corre-
sponding inflation differentials. In its turn, the cost of 
borrowing in the United States and Japan are, by far, 
much lower than in the European Union. 
The wide disparity between the interest rates charged by 
banks in the EC and the rates at which firms in Japan and 
the United States can obtain funds on their own domes-
tic markets gives cause for concern also in view of its 
effects on the competitiveness of European SMEs. If 
European SMEs are in future to compete on more fa-
vourable terms with their Japanese and North American 
counterparts, their financing costs must be brought 
down to those borne by firms in countries where rates 
are lowest. 
One of the objectives of the integration of financial 
markets is to ensure that EC firms enjoy the same op-
portunities for borrowing and lending, and can do so 
under the same terms, thus removing restrictions to free 
competition. This means that there should be competi-
tion between financial institutions, and this should en-
courage them to offer better, more efficient services at 
lower costs to their customers. 
The findings of these studies lead to the conclusion that 
EC financial markets are not fully integrated since con-
siderable differences remain between the cost of credit 
in the various Member States. 
SMEs have so far seldom had access to the financial 
markets of other Member States, either for want of in-
formation enabling them to choose the best terms or be-
cause of the reluctance of financial institutions to grant 
loans to non resident firms or individuals. 
The most likely development that will enable SMEs to 
have recourse to foreign financial markets is the estab-
lishment of subsidiaries of financial institutions in other 
Member States. 
The financial institutions concerned will have to over-
come the obstacles that make it difficult for them to 
enter these new markets and the problems involved in 
the mobility of loans. 
The former obstacles appear to be on the decrease, 
chiefly owing to the development of information tech-
nology. 
Other impediments remain, such as fees and commis-
sions charged by banks when a firm wishes to pay off a 
loan in order to arrange another loan with a different 
bank make such transactions unprofitable for the firm 
concerned. As a result, it is more difficult to stimulate 
competition between financial institutions as part of the 
drive towards financial integration. 
Furthermore, banks operating abroad often do so as sec-
ondary banks, offering their services to firms as a "sec-
ond" bank, because they are not in a position to offer a 
full range of financial services. 
As a conclusion it can be noted that SMEs have not yet 
reaped their share, in the form of cheaper bank finance, 
of the benefits expected from financial integration. 
Such integration is as yet incomplete, and there is little 
competition between banks in different Member States 
as regards lending to SMEs. 
4.1.3 Financing ofSME's 
Small and medium-sized companies have to rely much 
more heavily on short-term external financing, by banks or 
other sources, than larger companies. Creditors of one year 
or less amounted, for those countries for which harmonized 
data are available (see table 19), to 31% for Sweden up to 
52% for Italy. In all those countries the respective share is 
lower for large companies. Large companies can rely to a 
larger extent on long-term debt and own capital. And, al-
though over the years 1985 to 1995 most companies made 
progress in securing more own capital, larger companies 
extended this gap towards smaller companies even further. 
Thus the split in financing between small and large com-
panies in Europe has been deepening. 
Small and medium-sized companies lack the access to 
capital markets as large companies in the EU do. This is 
true both for share capital and for fixed-income securities. 
The reasons are manifold14, among them the potential lock 
of control by the owner over the company and the impact on 
potential transparency and disclosure rules following a n 
exchange listing. 
In the past year two alternative systems of stock exchanges 
for smaller European companies has been started. Easdaq 
started in September 1996 and has, in the first year of its 
life, attracted around 15 companies with a capitalization of 
around 3 Bn. ECU. In spring 1997 7 companies with a 
market capitalization of 1.2 Bn ECU were listed. The 
14 See the Commission Communication: The European capital markets for small and 
medium-sized enterprises: perspectives and potential obstacles to their progress 
(COM(97) 187 final of 5 May 1997). 
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Euro-NM (new market) is a European Economic Interest 
Grouping, founded by the Paris, Brussels, Amsterdam and 
Frankfurt "New Markets" (NM). These markets started be-
tween February 1996 (Paris) and March 1997 (Frankfurt). 
The Paris market has attracted until summer 19997 31 com-
panies with a combined capitalization of around 1.6 Bn. 
ECU. The other markets are even younger than the Paris-
segment. Therefore, they have attracted even less listings. 
Together these four "New Market" segments had a market 
capitalization of around 3.8 Bn. ECU in Summer 1997. 
Turnover, and thus liquidity, are still extremely thin on 
these markets, and it will to be seen if these initiatives will 
succeed in provide a measurable alternative for the financ-
ing of SME's. The UK AIM has been more successful and 
has already a more sizeable listing (around 300 companies) 
and trading activities. 
economic environment, coupled with important techno-
logical advances, paved the way for impressive innovations 
in the financial markets, ranging from new financial instru-
ments to the creation of new segments in the capital 
markets. Derivatives markets, Euro-commercial paper 
market, swaps and many other financial innovations were 
born and now form an integral part of today's capital 
markets. 
The liberalization of capital movements is another import-
ant element which has granted institutional and retail in-
vestors the opportunity to base their respective portfolio 
strategies on global considerations as cross-border transac-
tions are available to any investor. 
This relatively small volume of market capitalization and 
trading activity contrasts sharply with the US. There the 
"National Association of Securities Dealers Automatic 
Quotation System" (NASDAQ) serves as a quasi -ex-
change for shares in smaller companies which do not qual-
ify for the listing on the larger national exchanges (NYSE, 
ASE)or which for other reasons remain on the NASDAQ 
system. More than 5700 companies (in the "small cap" or 
the "national market" segment) are presently traded on this 
exchange. This fully automated system creates consider-
able transparency and liquidity for the trading in shares of 
SME's, thus encouraging the funding of these companies 
by share capital. 
4.2 Financial markets' behaviour 
Thus, the present financial environment is radically differ-
ent from the one prevailing only ten years ago. Technologi-
cal advances which allow information to be disseminated 
globally on a real-time basis and transactions to be ex-
ecuted very quickly, financial innovation which allows in-
vestors to design any kind of portfolio investment strategy, 
liberalization of capital movements which allows capital to 
flow freely across frontiers and markets and the institution-
alization of savings which increase portfolio management 
skills and capabilities for quick reactions to changes in ex-
pectations, form the back bone of today's capital markets. 
All these factors make financial markets much more effi-
cient and reactive to any piece ofinformation so that news is 
quickly discounted and incorporated into the prices of fi-
nancial instruments. 
4.2.1 Present market environment 
The improvement in standards of living and the subsequent 
increase in the resources of economic agents in Western 
economies over the last decades, coupled with a higher de-
gree and extensive financial culture among them, has be-
come an important motor in the enormous increase regis-
tered in the amounts of funds invested by them in different 
financial instruments. Moreover ageing populations, soph-
istication of financial markets and information and transac-
tions costs are other elements that have contributed to a 
large extent to the so-called institutionalization of savings. 
Thus, today's financial markets are dominated by institu-
tional investors (pension funds, insurance companies, in-
vestment funds, banks, etc....). 
Another important element comes from the major advance 
in financial innovation registered during the 80's. The rela-
tively cozy 60's were replaced by the bumpy 70's which 
brought unexpected levels and volatilities in both inflation 
and interest rates. This major change in the financial and 
The question then must be whether this new environment 
has rendered financial markets more volatile. A first analy-
sis does not allow us to conclude that this is the case in either 
bond or equity markets. On the contrary, volatility of re-
turns in both cases has remained relatively stable over re-
cent years if exception is made for the 1987 equity market 
crash and the 1989 crisis where major corrections in equity 
prices occurred (program trading techniques played an im-
portant role in the first). 
Market behaviour has overall shown an increasing stability 
after the gradual liberalization and integration. Although 
free cross-border capital flows and services and more 
powerful information technology allow a more rapid entry 
and leaving of markets, market prices have nevertheless 
been decreasingly volatile and have therefore contributed 
to the overall stability and efficiency of the financial sector. 
Higher liquidity and better hedging possibilities as well as a 
more stable general economic framework might have con-
tributed to that result. 
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Chart 29 depicts, as an example, the volatility of share 
prices, measured in monthly relative changes (in absolute 
terms), on an annual average basis. The very large differ­
ence between the US, and also the UK, on the one hand, and 
other EU markets has gradually decreased over the past 
decade. Nowadays EU markets are not significantly more 
volatile than the large and liquid US market, although nat­
urally some differences remain which are to a large degree 
explained by the respective size of the markets. In particu­
lar, smaller Community stock markets have seen a con­
siderable reduction of their volatility, although they are still 
significantly more volatile than the larger markets in the EU 
or elsewhere. 
Smaller stock markets with narrower liquidity show, as ex­
pected, a significantly higher volatility in stock prices than 
larger ones. 
GRAPH 29: Volatility of share prices 
(monthly change over previous month in percent, annual averages) 
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Source : Eurostat, own calculations. 
Financial integration gradually leads to a higher correlation 
of prices on European Union stock markets15. Therefore 
country specific factors for the explanation of share price 
movements are gradually losing their influence and are pro­
gressively replaced by industry specific factors. 
4.2.2 Volatility, capital movements, and transaction 
taxes 
Most of the legal obstacles to cross-border capital move­
ments which still existed 20 years ago have been success­
fully dismantled. Furthermore, for certain forms of capital 
movements, no economic or technical obstacles to efficient 
cross-border position taking exists. This is particularly 
true for interbank markets in currencies and organized de­
rivatives markets. 
The simultaneous observance of free capital movements, 
independent monetary policy and fixed exchange rates has 
been proved increasingly inconsistent. Particularly the 
EMS turmoils in 1992 and 1993 had been attributed to un­
checked speculative currency flows; particularly by off­
shore based so-called hedge funds. These hedge funds are 
pools of financial assets which are typically highly lever­
aged, in a double way: They borrow a considerable amount 
of money to be added to their own assets; and they typically 
invest in forward currency contracts which are themselves 
normally leveraged tenfold. Thus, certain forms of reintro­
duction of capital movement restrictions have been under 
discussion. 
Generally, as for any market, interference via the price 
mechanism is less distortive than quantitative restrictions. 
Therefore, for the international capital markets, rather than 
outright capital controls, taxes on certain transactions in fi­
nancial assets, such as securities or foreign exchange trans­
action taxes, as means to increase transaction costs, con­
tinue to attract attention from those who look to reduce the 
volume of transactions on these markets. 
Such taxes play in practice a small and decreasing role. 
Most European countries have opted for the abolition of 
such a tax. The main motive behind this was the experience 
that such a levy would drive underlying business abroad. 
With the increased availability of information technology, 
the mobility of such business has further increased. Thus, 
there is no doubt, that such a tax, it is hardly enforceable16. 
Furthermore, the introduction of a transaction tax on 
foreign exchange transactions is also from the view of EC 
legislation on the freedom of capital movements (Art. 73b) 
very questionable. 
However, most fundamentally, it seems clear that capital 
controls of any form are nowadays not only very difficult 
to enforce, as the possibility of circumvention has in­
creased in parallel with the integration of the national 
economies and the advances of information technology, 
but are also not a tool to fight currency turmoil but could 
rather cause it17. 
See Beckers S., Connor, G., Curds, R.; 
Returns", June 1995. 
"National versus Global Factors in Equity 
' The Swedish experience with such a tax in the 1980 - 87 period is clearly described in 
Umlauf, Steven; Transaction Taxes and Stock Market Behaviour: The Swedish Ex­
perience; IFA Working Paper 150-91; 1991. 
' See Delias, H., Stockman, Α.; "Self-fulfilling Expectations, Speculative Attack, and 
Capital Controls"; JMCB; Vol. 25(4); 1993,; p. 721-30. 
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Box 4: Typology of investor behaviour 
Investors placing their funds into financial instruments 
demonstrate different behaviour which has a direct im-
pact on their portfolio strategy and management and on 
the markets in which they are active. Three major cat-
egories can be outlined for a better understanding of 
their behaviour and their impact on capital markets: 
demonstrated in several studies on the major markets. 
This result could not be otherwise, except for short term 
periods of time when financial markets suffer correc-
tions due to changes in participants' expectations. 
short term investors and speculators: 
long term investors: 
Traditional institutional investors such as pension funds 
or insurance companies, together with corporate treas-
uries and a big part of retail investors form the bulk of 
these kind of investors. They are the dominant force 
and ultimate trend-setters on financial markets. Invest-
ment decisions are mainly based on long-term funda-
mental considerations and often maintained for a long 
period of time. Thus changes in their portfolio strat-
egies are relatively infrequent and normally based on 
changes in economic fundamentals. 
However, given the importance of the size of these port-
folios, even small changes in their expectations and in-
vestment strategies (for example a reduction of 5% in 
the equity holdings part of their portfolio in favour of 
fixed-income securities) can have an important impact 
on financial markets. 
These kind of investors base their investment decisions 
on fundamental, chartist and some other less conven-
tional analysis. They operate actively in the cash and 
derivatives markets and realize profits (or losses) quick-
ly then moving on to the next objective. They carry out 
a very active management of their respective portfolios 
and take and undo their positions within short periods of 
time, ranging from hours to a few months. 
In this category two subcategories can be identified: 
those managing their portfolios without any major kind 
of leverage and those heavily leveraged which are the 
only ones that could be really labelled as "speculators". 
In the first sub-category one could include a relatively 
small share of retail investors and some banks active in 
the management of their own trading portfolio (so-
called proprietary trading). 
The investment decisions are typically based on the dis-
counting of future expected cash-flows of different fi-
nancial instruments, within a given risk-return frame-
work. Thus, such investors tend to choose those finan-
cial assets with the highest expected rates of return for a 
given risk. 
In the second sub-category are typically the so-called 
hedge funds and some other non-traditional funds, 
which take very aggressive and leveraged positions 
both through borrowing (via securities collateral) and 
through the derivatives markets. 
These investors operate normally in the cash markets 
and use derivatives either for hedging purposes or for 
transforming part of the upward price potential of the 
instrument into an additional return on the asset (by 
covered short operations thereby selling put options on 
instruments they are in possession of). 
This kind of risk-averse behaviour from the major 
players in financial markets assures that in the long term 
riskier assets should offer higher returns and vice versa. 
Thus, normally short term fixed income securities offer 
the lowest real return, followed by long term fixed in-
come securities and by equities, which represent, a 
priori, the inverted order of risk. This fact has been 
The amount managed by this type of investors is rela-
tively small as compared to the former. Nevertheless, 
the leverage of their positions and the velocity of their 
movements can have a relatively major impact in some 
segments of the financial markets at some specific mo-
ment. In this sense, they "speculate" on future move-
ments in financial instruments and, thus, they can pro-
voke some kind of overshooting in the markets in some 
cases. 
However, with the support of traditional institutional in-
vestors, which have the necessary strength, financial 
markets correct the situation adequately to market par-
ticipants' expectations based on economic and financial 
fundamentals. 
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Box 4 (continued) 
The "dangers" of these short term investors and specu-
lators are limited, since for them to have a major impact 
on financial markets a clear majority of them has to take 
the same-way bet at the same moment, which is im-
probable. It should also be noted that while the profits 
of speculative investors are often highlighted, their 
losses are not often the subject of the same publicity. 
Short term trading has a major beneficial by-product: 
the increase in liquidity it supplies to secondary 
markets. 
This is important for the functioning of financial 
markets, since a highly liquid secondary market is a 
basic condition for the existence of a primary market. 
Only the proper functioning of the latter allows the issu-
ing of new equity and other forms of risk-capital, as 
well as fixed-income securities. Moreover, liquid sec-
ondary markets reduce the price risk of any financial in-
vestment and, thus, reduce the premium demanded on 
it, lowering the relative costs involved.arbitrageurs 
and some other forms of professional activism: 
These investors take advantage of differences between 
prices of the same or similar financial instruments 
quoted simultaneously in different markets. One of the 
most lucrative arbitrage activities is that between de-
rivatives markets and the underlying cash market, by 
which market operators correct excessive differences in 
prices of the same instrument, for example the cash 
market index and a futures contract on the same index. 
This activity is under normal circumstances risk free, 
but demands the use of advanced technology and man-
agement skills. Hence, banks and securities houses are 
normally the only market participants. It increases the 
efficiency of financial markets, since it assures uni-
formity of prices, integration of different financial 
centres and adds liquidity to markets. 
5. INEFFICIENCIES IN MARKET STRUC-
TURE AND REGULATION 
5.1 Lack of sufficiently large and efficient financial 
markets 
It has to be assumed that in all countries a further integration 
of financial markets would benefit the efficiency of the fi-
nancial system. And particularly in those countries with a 
cumulation of disadvantageous financial markets' struc-
tures, even the development of the domestic financial 
market should exhibit high efficiency returns. 
The overall situation shows relatively well developed and 
complete financial market structures within the EU. How-
ever, very often these markets are relatively small, and thus 
not operational. This applies for example to many stock 
markets (particularly in the Southern and smaller countries) 
and several bond markets. Also the banking system is, al-
though in every country present with a full range of core 
banking business, of very different quality and, particularly 
in the smaller countries, highly concentrated. 
Cross-border capital movements and cross-border provi-
sion of financial services are the basic instruments to en-
hance the efficiency on European capital markets by creat-
ing one large market. Several factors, indicated below, 
hinder the European capital markets however in fully reap-
ing the benefit of its potentially combined volume, degree 
of development, and intensity of competition. 
5.2 Financial markets and accounting standards 
Overall, as compared to other large capital markets, such as 
the US, all European capital markets lack some size advan-
tages and a certain degree of deepness and sophistication. 
The findings show a wide spread of available instruments, 
markets, and institutions among the EU countries. Disad-
vantages in one sector are normally not compensated for by 
other advantages. Particularly in several countries, such as 
Greece or Portugal, a relatively inefficient banking sector is 
aggravated by the lack of alternatives for company finance 
on the capital markets. 
Financial statements are one of the most important tools 
that enable investors to assess the economic performance of 
companies, and accounting standards are the basis upon 
which financial statements are prepared. When accounting 
standards vary from country to country, it becomes difficult 
and more expensive to assess the comparative value and 
performance of enterprises. 
The harmonisation of accounting standards thus contrib-
utes significantly to the integration of financial markets. 
32-
The EU's accounting directives18 provide the basis for the 
mutual recognition of company accounts for the purpose of 
obtaining listings on the Community's principal stock 
markets and help to enhance financial transparency for the 
more efficient functioning of the financial markets. 
towards improving audit quality will be the adoption by the 
Commission later this year of a specific Communication on 
statutory auditing, which follows on from the 1996 Green 
Paper and Conference on "the role, the position and the lia-
bility of the statutory auditor within the European Union" . 
The Community securities Directives, however, do not pre-
vent stock exchanges in the EU from requiring or permit-
ting the presentation of accounts for companies seeking a 
listing to follow standards other than those resulting from 
the accounting directives, including US General Accepted 
Accounting Standards. Moreover, compared to the US, en-
forcement of financial reporting standards in Europe is not 
as strong as it could be. 
At the international level, the exponential development of 
financial markets and their globalisation has resulted in an 
increased demand for highly developed accounting in-
formation. This led to the International Organisation of 
Securities Commissions (IOSCO) and the International 
Accounting Standards Committee (IASC) agreeing to es-
tablish a core set of accounting standards which would sat-
isfy the information needs of the most sophisticated secu-
rities markets, by 1998. 
5.3 Information and Rating Agencies 
One of the main conditions for an efficient capital market is 
the availability of information to investors and savers19. 
Equally, one of the remaining obstacles to an effective in-
tegration of European financial markets and thus to access 
of EU companies to cross-border financing is the given 
lack of information among investors about capital markets 
and borrowers other than the respective home market. 
One of the necessary devices to spread information particu-
larly in the securities market sector are rating agencies. 
Ratings on the European capital markets so far play mainly 
a role on markets for debt instruments (bonds; money 
market papers, medium-term notes), mainly for financial 
institutions and supranationals. 
Increasingly European companies are finding that they can 
only meet their capital requirement by requesting listings 
on international financial markets outside Europe. Such 
companies are at a disadvantage if they are obliged to pre-
pare two sets of accounts, one to satisfy European require-
ments and the other to meet the requirements of specific fi-
nancial markets or IAS. In order to avoid this drawback, the 
European Commission adopted Accounting Harmonisa-
tion: a New Strategy vis-à-vis International Harmonisa-
tion (COM 95 (508)) in 1995, with the basic objective of 
associating the EU with the joint IASC-IOSCO project. 
The Commission is committed to ensuring that IAS are 
compatible with the accounting directives, first by ensuring 
a more influential expression of the European view in the 
IASC and secondly, if necessary, by proposing changes to 
the Directives. 
Financial information is only of use in so far as it is credible. 
To have confidence in financial information, financial 
markets must have assurance about the bases on which the 
information has been prepared. Therefore it is necessary 
for financial statements to be audited by qualified pro-
fessionals in accordance with generally accepted auditing 
standards. There is not yet an agreement in the EU on a 
common set of standards for auditors. An important step 
The market in this segment is very developed in the US, and 
rather weak in Europe. However, also in Europe it is domi-
nated by the two large US agencies, Standard ά Poors 
(owned by McGraw-Hill) and Moody's (owned by Dun & 
Bradstreet Corp.). These two companies form an oligopol­
istic market, each protected by the US Securities Exchange 
Commission (SEC) recognition as "nationally recognized 
statistical rating organization" (NRSRO). 
The exclusive status of these two rating agencies give them 
a very unique power in the pricing of financial markets, in­
cluding the interest levels in the different national markets 
(by rating changes for the respective sovereign debt in the 
country, recent example: downgrading of Sweden). How­
ever it seems that the SEC increasingly imposes rules on the 
business behaviour of such NRSRO's, thus partly depriving 
them from their independence. This trend might eventually 
lead to a situation where US regulatory authorities have a 
decisive say on the international financial markets' pricing 
behaviour and thus interest rates. 
Market entry barriers for newcomers on the rating agency 
market are considerable, as it is difficult to convince poten-
18 Fourth Council Directive (78/660/EEC) of 25 July 1978 on the annual accounts of cer­
tain types of companies, O.J. No. L 222 of 14.8.78; Seventh Council Directive 
(83/349/EEC) of 13 June 1983 on consolidated accounts, O.J. No. L 193 of 18.7.83. 
19 See also : Gordon .Roger, Bovenberg A. L.; Why is capital so immobile international­
ly ? Possible Explanations and implications for capital income taxation; in: American 
Economic Review, December 1996, Vol. 86(5), p. 1057 ff. 
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ti ally rated companies of the marginal benefits of a third or 
fourth rating. 
viding market efficiency, the role of rating agencies has 
been nevertheless fostered by different measures: 
There exist only three European rating agencies at the mo­
ment: the relatively small Portuguese Companhia Portu­
guesa de Rating Sociedade Anonima (founded in 1988), 
which is active only on its domestic market, Italrating, 
founded recently in Italy, and IBCA, a French owned com­
pany, and. The latter is the largest European rating agency, 
has grown from an agency more or less specialized on 
banking assessment into a full scale rating agency, active in 
several countries, in particular the British industrial sector. 
Furthermore, after IBCA UK has been taken over by a 
French agency and been merged, IBCA is the largest and, 
apart from a small Portuguese one, the only European con­
trolled rating agency, and in Europe behind the two large 
US agencies (S&P, Moody's) the third largest one. Efforts 
in Germany to establish a national rating agency (in particu­
lar pushed by Deutsche Bank) have been abandoned. 
1. National and subfederai borrowers actively ask for rat­
ings of at least one nationally controlled rating 
agencies. 
Obliging institutional investors to invest certain parts 
of their portfolios in investment grade debt (highly 
rated securities) or even oblige certain issuers to obtain 
20 a rating 
3. The US SEC issues common minimum rules for the 
recognition of a rating agency in the respective market. 
5.4 Income and corporate taxes 
Rating plays a prominent role in the United Kingdom, 
where all the three large agencies compile ratings for 
around 60 to 90 companies. The second most developed 
country is France with 30 to 50 ratings. In all the other EU 
countries, company debt rating is just in its infancy and nor­
mally confined to internationally active banks. 
In order to develop direct company funding on the Euro­
pean debt markets, rating would have to be considerably 
extended. On the other hand, a relatively low exposure on 
these markets prevents these companies from actively 
looking for such ratings. 
In the US the development of rating agencies as a device for 
information transfer has been driven by rules on the invest­
ment policy of institutional investors. Such rules force 
them to distinguish between rated and unrated companies; 
with limits being stricter on investment in the latter com­
panies. Thus for companies an incentive exists to obtain a 
rating, which bears two costs, the direct cost of rating 
(which is rather small) and the cost associated with the risk 
of getting a poor rating or being downgraded at a later stage. 
With increasing institutionalization of financial markets, 
the incentive in obtain a rating is constantly growing. 
Further factors in favour of US rating agencies has been the 
large number of US banks, artificially inflated by the pro­
hibition of interstate banking. 
The development and setting up of rating agencies is a pri­
vate sector task. Thus potential Community action is very 
limited. In other markets, notably the US, where rating 
agencies have traditionally played an important role in pro­
The globalization of financial markets and the abolition of 
exchange controls has made it more difficult to monitor 
systems of residence based taxation. Additionally, in 
countries with bank secrecy, it is difficult to enforce interest 
income taxation, even on domestic income. 
These considerations, among others, have led to significant 
changes in taxation rates and policies over the recent past 
which have tended to result in rates on internationally mo­
bile factors of production being set low, even those such as 
capital which is in fixed supply and thus a good candidate 
for taxation at a global level, with a shifting of taxation on to 
immobile factors (see table 20). 
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To a large extent these changes have been a reaction to diffi­
culties that have become apparent in enforcing domestic 
taxation rather than part of a coherent plan to draw up a ra­
tional and efficient tax system at international or regional 
level satisfying the traditional benchmarks of capital export 
and import neutrality used to evaluate the taxation of in­
ternational capital flows, or to take a broader view of the de­
sirable mix of taxation on capital and labour. 
National differences in the tax rate and the definition of the 
tax base violate the principle of locational neutrality, stipu­
lating that tax regimes ought not to influence the choice of 
jurisdiction in which to invest. From the viewpoint of 
theory such fiscally induced competitive distortions should 
be eliminated for the sake of allocative optimality in the 
EU, especially in the context of the internal market which, 
by eliminating other market barriers, increases the leverage 
of fiscal distortions. 
Even at the Community level, for instance, proposals for a 
common minimum withholding tax on interest income, al­
though representing a significant step, if adopted, towards a 
more level playing field and a floor to unbridled tax com­
petition for non­residents' deposits, do little to solve the 
differential treatment of taxation of income from equity and 
debt instruments. However since the latter are more mo­
bile, they attract more policy interest because of the evident 
diminution of taxable capacity. 
GRAPH 3 1 : Taxation of capital income 
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Whether it is desirable that taxation should encourage debt 
rather than equity financing of firms, or capital as againstla­
bour inputs in the production function, would seem to be 
amore marginal consideration in policy­makers decision­
parameters, but one which could have a significant influ­
ence on job creation. 
5.4.1 Taxation of corporate income 
The corporate tax regime can exert an important influence 
on a company's competitiveness21. Changes in national 
corporate tax rules affect the international competitiveness 
of domestic firms in ways that do not necessarily reflect un­
derlying fundamentals. 
The elimination of such fiscal distortions, by improving al­
locative efficiency, would encourage the flow of Commun­
ity savings into the most productive pre­tax investment 
projects and could accordingly be expected to boost job cre­
ation. 
The marginal effective tax rate has been determined to be a 
prime determinant of savings and investment in an econ­
omy. It measures the wedge between the pre­tax rate of re­
turn on a marginal investment project and the post­tax rate 
of return on that project for the eventual investor, be it an 
individual or a firm. Various academic studies and surveys 
by international institutions22 have computed for individ­
ual countries a very large number of marginal effective cor­
porate tax rates. 
These turn out to vary substantially (sometimes by more 
than 200%) among different industrial sectors, mode of fi­
nance, and among different categories of original investors. 
These large differences are observed when making cross­
country comparisons, documenting the strong locational 
non­neutrality for individual investment projects and in­
vestors. The divergences are attributable, in descending 
order of importance, to the following three sets of factors: 
GRAPH 32 : Required Rate of Return on Investment 
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1 See for example a recent study: Hines, James; Altered states: Taxes and the location of 
foreign direct investment in America; in: American Economic Review, December 
1996, Vol. 86(5), p. 1076 ff. See for example King and Fullerton ( 1984), McKee, Visser and Saunders ( 1986), Al­worth (1987), OECD (1991), OECD (1993), IMF (1993). 
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TABLE 20 : Implicit tax rates on production factors (1994) 
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average 
labour 
Β 
DK 
D 
EL 
E 
F 
IRL 
I 
L 
NL 
A 
Ρ 
FIN 
S 
UK 
EU average 
Source : Europ ean Commission. 
45.8 
46.6 
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39.8 
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26.2 
40.5 
1.5 
2 
3.2 
6.1 
4 
1.4 
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­3.1 
0.1 
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­0.1 
0 
3.1 
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­2.5 
3.9 
­8.9 
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­11 
10.5 
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^t.7 
14.5 
12.1 
­14.3 
level 1994 change over 1985 deviation from EU 
average 
other production factors 
38 
31.9 
40.9 
8.7 
26.6 
44.9 
29.2 
34.8 
49.3 
37.3 
37.1 
16.3 
21.3 
34.7 
32.4 
35.2 
­2.5 
­5.1 
­7.1 
­6.3 
6.7 
­6.6 
3.6 
7.9 
16.4 
6.8 
­3.8 
­8.2 
5.4 
0.9 
­30.1 
­8.1 
2.8 
­3.3 
5.7 
­26.5 
­8.6 
9.7 
­6 
­0.4 
14.1 
2.1 
1.9 
­18.9 
­13.9 
­0.5 
­2.8 
• differences in the definition of the tax base (allowances 
for losses, inflation accounting, the tax treatment of 
foreign investment, depreciation allowances, etc.); 
differences in corporate tax rates and in investment in­
centives; 
differences in personal income tax and wealth tax (i. e. 
in some countries corporate taxes are linked to capital 
income taxes, whereas in others they are not). 
The Council adopted on 1 December 1997 a Code of Con­
duct for Business Taxation. This code identifies tax mea­
sures which are potentially harmful and provides a frame­
work within which Member States can commit themselves 
to follow the principles of fair competition. 
5.4.2 Taxation of savings 
As suggested above the tax treatment of savings in the 
Community gives rise to a number of efficiency concerns. 
It would therefore seem desirable that Community prio­
rities in the area of corporate taxation should be set23 ac­
cording to the magnitude of efficiency gains to be achieved. 
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The different treatment of interest income received by resi­
dents and non­residents (see table 21) has contributed to a 
massive tax­driven reallocation of savings capital in the 
Union. Cross­border bank deposits have risen consider­
ably within the European Union. Main centres attracting 
these funds are the UK, Germany and Luxembourg. Cross­
border non­bank depositors are mainly German, Dutch and 
UK residents. 
While the differential treatment afforded through taxation 
to capital vis­à­vis labour is outside the scope of a study 
concentrating on the financial markets, it should be noted 
that it must have an important impact on the employment 
intensity of investment. To a large extent, national policies 
in this area are conditioned by the ability to tax the more in­
ternationally mobile factors of production, the desire to 
avoid significant leakages abroad and, perversely, to attract 
resources from partner countries. 
The problems are primarily concentrated in the area of in­
terest income from debt instrument (bank accounts and 
bonds) which generally are subject to much lower rates of 
taxation than direct participation in companies (dividend 
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TABLE 21 
Β 
DK 
D 
EL 
E 
F 
IRL 
I 
L 
NL 
A 
Ρ 
FIN 
S 
UK 
: Withholding tax on interest on 
residents 
15** 
* 
30 
15 
25 
20.9 
27 
30 
0 
* 
25** 
25 
28** 
30** 
25 
bank deposits 
non­residents 
o · 
0 
0 
10 
0 
0 
0 
0­30 
0 
0 
0 
15­20 
0 
0 
0 
* reporting system. **) final tax. 
GRAPH 34 : International banking centres 
Liabilities of banks vis­à­vis foreign non­banks 
(Bn. US­$, end 1996) 
income). Given the general objective of promoting risk­
taking and entrepreneurship, this would not seem to be the 
appropriate policy prescription. 
Even in the area of dividend taxation, the complex interac­
tion of different forms of corporate taxation, withholding 
taxes and bilateral double taxation arrangements, means 
that the tax rate on dividends from another EU country, in 
one specific case recently analyzed by the Commission ser­
vices, can be up to 20% higher than that charged on domes­
tic dividends. Such distortions, which are undoubtedly 
widespread, result in a suboptimal allocation of savings at a 
Community level as well as wasted resources involved in 
the search for the most tax­efficient solutions. 
On the taxation of interest income, the most direct way to 
combat tax evasion would be the introduction of general­
ized reporting requirements. However given the diffi­
culties on achieving agreement within the Community on 
such a measure, ås well as the wider international coordina­
tion desirable to avoid derealization, current proposals for 
a minimum Community withholding tax, while not fully 
addressing distortions between debt and equity financing, 
would, if adopted, go some way to reducing the tax com­
petition for mobile capital and setting a floor to effective 
taxation of interest income.24 
Although the effect of such a tax, or a more generalized re­
porting system, would be to increase the wedge between in­
terest paid by the borrower and interest received by the 
lender, it can be demonstrated that the economic welfare­
losses associated with such an increase could be more than 
compensated for by gains achieved by a corresponding re 
300-
200 
lOOr I 
η r i _ _^H_ 
Β DK D E F IRL I L NL A FIN S UK CH Cayman 
Islands 
Source : BIS. 
duction in taxation on inputs which are presently taxed at 
high rates. In addition it should be pointed out that the pres­
ent taxation bias in favour of bonds and bank interest, can 
result in an additional link in the intermediation chain, and 
also gives a competitive edge to government financing as 
opposed to publicly quoted companies, which, apart from 
large multinationals, rarely tap the bond market. 
GRAPH 35 : Foreign bank deposits 
Assets of non­banks abroad in different countries 
(Bn. US­$, end 1996) 
1 
300 
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100­
B/L DK D EL E F I NL A Ρ FIN S UK 
Source: BIS. 
US Japan 
It is considered that any move towards a more equal and 
transparent tax treatment of the different forms of financing 
of the economy, would result in a more efficient flow of sav­
ings into productive job­creating investment. 
5.5 Restrictions on capital allocation for institu­
tional investors 
24 See also the Commission documents on this subject: "Taxation in the European Union", 20.03 1996 (SEQ96) 487 final) and "Taxation in the European Union ­ Re­port on the Development of Tax Systems", 22 10. 1996 (C0M(96)546 final). 
In the majority of European countries, prudential regula­
tions on institutional investors as regards the types of finan­
cial instruments in which they can invest their funds take 
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the form of explicit limits, which tend to penalize equities 
and any other form of risk capital investment and to favour 
fixed­income securities. One specific set of restrictions on 
investment abroad by insurance companies is given below. 
restrictions on a single issuer: the reasoning being that 
the institutional investor portfolio should be invested 
in a wide variety of issuers and undertakings to reduce 
the impact that a bankruptcy of any of them could have 
on its financial stability. 
Initially, these regulations were introduced many years ago, 
firstly, since fixed­income securities were a less risky asset 
as compared to equity holdings and, thus, as a way of reduc­
ing the volatility in the institutional investors' portfolios re­
turns and assuring their financial stability. 
Secondly, as an indirect way of placing the ever increasing 
amounts of public debt issues to fund persistent deficits in a 
sure, easier and less costly way. This has been typically the 
case in continental European countries, which have used 
these kind of limits extensively. On the contrary, Anglo­
Saxon economies have tended to implement the so­called 
"prudent­man" rule by which institutional investors decide 
freely the mix of their portfolios, subject only to some gen­
eral principles based on prudence, such as diversification of 
instruments and risks, no excessive concentration in one 
single issuer, etc. ... 
This major difference in regulatory structures as regards the 
freedom of institutional investors to invest their funds has 
had an important impact in their portfolio mix. Insurance 
companies and pension funds in continental Europe tend to 
be heavily invested in fixed­income securities while their 
Anglo­Saxon counterparts are in equities, based on the un­
derstanding that, from a long­term perspective, returns in 
equities are higher than in fixed­income securities (as has 
been proved frequently in various studies) and provide a 
better protection against inflation. 
restrictions on foreign (currency) holdings: the rea­
soning being that the currency risk of any portfolio is a 
specific risk against which any institutional investor 
should be covered. 
TABLE 22 : Regulations on investment abroad by insurance 
companies (Ceilings on investment in foreign assets 
or assets denominated in foreign currency) 
Β Technical reserves : to be located in Belgium. 
DK None. 
D Up to 5% of the premium reserve stock and 20% of the re­
maining restricted assets. In addition, specific ceilings range 
from 5% to 20% depending on the foreign assets concerned. 
EL EC legislation applies. 
E None vis­à­vis OECD countries. Documents of title to capital 
assets to be located in Spain. 
F None vis­à­vis OECD countries. Documents of title to capital 
assets must normally be located in France. 
IRL None. 
I EC legislation applies. 
L Technical reserves : up to 10% in securities of other OECD 
countries. 
NL None. 
A Technical reserves for contracts denominated in Austrian 
currency : located in Austria. 
Ρ Assets to be located in EC countries. 
FIN Technical reserves : Finnish real estate, securities, or assets 
guaranteed by residents. 
S Technical reserves : no more than 20% (unless to cover liabil­
ities in the same currency), to be localized in Sweden. 
UK None. 
Source : OECD. 
Specifically, there are four major restrictions usually im­
posed on institutional investors as regards their freedom to 
invest: 
1. restrictions on equity holdings: the regulatory reason­
ing behind this being that equities are riskier assets and 
their returns present a higher degree of volatility than 
fixed­income securities, which is true in the short term 
Restrictions on equity holdings partly overlook the fact that 
institutional investors, specially pension funds, have a long 
term perspective because their liabilities come due, nor­
mally, many years ahead and, thus, short term volatility of 
equity holdings are not relevant for their long term invest­
ment strategies. Furthermore, past evidence shows that 
particularly equity holdings allow institutional investors to 
hedge against the inflation risk associated to a much higher 
degree with fixed­income securities or loans. 
restrictions on controlling­stake equity holdings: 
the regulatory reasoning behind this being that the pur­
pose of institutional investors investment decisions 
should be exclusively based on a portfolio strategy and 
not in getting involved in corporate governance of the 
undertakings where their funds are invested. 
Restrictions on foreign holdings are in contrast to modern 
portfolio theory25, which defends and demonstrates empi­
rically that diversification is a much better and more power­
ful way of reducing currency risk than any kind of alterna­
tive regulation based on specific limits on foreign currency 
2 5 Of which the major exponents are the recent Nobel prize winners, Markowitz, Sharpe 
and Miller. 
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holdings (the so­called currency matching rules). More­
over, this kind of regulatory approach has a negative impact 
on cross border capital movements, with negative conse­
quences on an efficient allocation of capital resources 
across Europe, since, with a very few exceptions, institu­
tional investors are indirectly obliged to invest within their 
national boundaries given the fact that very few national­
currency­denominated financial instruments exist abroad. 
segment of capital markets throughout Europe (with a very 
few exceptions) and to the crowding­out effect that public 
debt securities exert on private issues, not only at the market 
level, but also at portfolio level through liquidity, quality of 
the issuer, concentration on a single issuer and other similar 
regulatory requirements. 
Restrictions on the investment in single companies are 
driven by regulatory concern about the total risk of the port­
folio of these institutional investors. It is unquestioned, that 
all other things being equal, the broader diversification of 
the equity assets on more companies reduces the overall 
portfolio risk. 
Thus, the major conclusion is that, although institutional in­
vestors are important suppliers of long term capital, they al­
locate a relatively small proportion of their resources to the 
productive sector of the economy, partly due to regulatory 
requirements based, initially, on prudential considerations, 
but not always justified on these grounds. 
However, two major developments on the financial 
markets of all major industrialized countries challenge, at 
least to some degree, the wisdom of such restrictions. First­
ly, modern financial markets, and particularly stock and 
stock index derivative markets allow efficient hedging 
against certain risks stemming from unexpected changes of 
prices of financial assets. Secondly, the increasing role of 
institutional investors as shareholders bears the risk that, to­
gether with those mentioned restrictions, more and more 
companies will end up with a relatively dispersed owner­
ship structure. This poses the mentioned problems of man­
agement control and might change the long­term objec­
tives of the companies in a disadvantageous way. 
5.6 Government crowding out 
The level and development of government debt can have 
significant adverse effects on the access of the private sec­
tor to funding for job creating investment projects. While 
the significance of crowding out may be less pronounced 
than in the eighties, as governments, encouraged by the 
quantitative goals set out in the Treaty, have increasingly 
raised the profile of debt and budget targeting and as recent 
slippage in the area is counteracted by more buoyant re­
ceipts in the recovery phase, this recovery will also bring a 
growing funding demand from business. In those countries 
with a large outstanding stock of public debt and high defi­
cits, if public spending is not kept on a tight rein, private 
job­creating investment will suffer the consequences of 
this policy failure. 
All restrictions listed above have a compound effect on the 
way institutional investors place their funds between differ­
ent financial instruments. They allocate a relatively small 
proportion of their resources to equities and other risk­
capital instruments (except for Anglo­Saxon institutional 
investors which are subject to a more flexible regulatory 
structure). Moreover, this part is basically invested in well­
established companies (the so­called blue chips), because 
these are the only firms whose shares present enough li­
quidity in the markets (usually another regulatory require­
ment). Thus, this fact has, as its major consequence, that 
unquoted companies and small and medium­sized firms do 
not benefit from the most important source of capital in 
today's financial markets (a very rough estimate places at 
between 60% to 80% the participation of institutional in­
vestors in today's capital markets transactions). 
GRAPH 36 : Goverment net borrowing 
(general government, in percent of GDP) 
% 
— EU* US JP 
JAPAN 
1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 
A second consequence is that, even in the predominantly 
fixed­income securities part of institutional investors' 
portfolio, private sector debt plays a relatively modest role. 
This is, in part, due to a general lack of development of this 
*: EU(15),until 1990 not East Germany, 1988 and 1989 without Luxembourg. 
Source : European Commission. 
22 December 1997 

40-
Principal economie policy measures - November 1997 
Community (EUR-15) 
5.11 The Ecofin Council has an in depth exchange of views on employment 
issues, based on the Commission's proposal for guidelines for Member States 
employment policies 1998. 
The Commission adopts a communication on a package to tackle harmful tax 
competition in the European Union. The main components of the package are 
a code of conduct for business taxation and measures to eliminate distortions 
to the taxation of capital income. 
12.11 The Commission adopts a communication on the possibility of a re­
duced VAT rate on labour intense services for an experimental period and on 
an optional basis. 
17.11 The Ecofin Council notes that circulation of euro notes and coins shall 
begin on 1 January 2002. 
An extraordinary Ecofin/Labour and Social Affairs Joint Council meeting ap­
proves the draft 1997 Joint Employment Report. 
18.11 The Commission endorses general orientations for a review of the ap­
plication of state aide rules to measures relating to the direct taxation of com­
panies. 
20./21.11 The extraordinary European Council arrives at a political agree­
ment on the guidelines for Member States employment policies 1998. The 
guidelines centre on improving employability, developing entrepreneurship, 
encouraging adaptability and strengthening equal opportunities. 
Belgium (B) 
None. 
Denmark (DK) 
None. 
Germany (D) 
6.11 The Cabinet approves a draft bill reforming stock company law. The new 
regulations aim at improving control over and transparency of companies, 
giving more powers and duties to the Supervisory Board (Aufsichtsrat). 
Greece (GR) 
12.11 Presentation of the 1998 Budget to Parliament; it provides for the reduc­
tion of the central government deficit from 6.2% of GDP in 1997 to 4.4% of 
GDP in 1998. The general government deficit is projected to be 2.4% of GDP 
in 1998 from 4.2% of GDP in 1997. Nominal GDP is projected to rise by 8.4% 
in 1998 and inflation to be 2.5% at year-end or 3.7% on average. 
Spain (E) 
28.11 The central and regional governments reach an agreement on the new 
territorial health financing system for the period 1998-2001. Under this 
agreement, the budgeted expenditure for the whole health system will be in­
creased in 1998 by ESP 316 billion to ESP 3 769 billion. 
France (F) 
19.11 The government adopts the Supplementary Finance Bill for 1997, 
which presents the final projections for the 1997 budget. The State budget 
deficit for 1997 is now projected to stand at FRF 270.7 bn (3.35% of GDP) 
compared with an initial objective of FRF 284.8 bn (3.45% of GDP). Accord­
ing to the government, this good performance will make it possible to achieve 
the 3.1% of GDP target for the 1997 general government deficit. 
Ireland (IRL) 
None. 
Italy (I) 
21.11 The Italian Senate approves the Budget Law for 1998. 
Luxembourg (L) 
14.11 Government approves an investment package amounting to LUF 121 
billion for the period 1997-2001. 
Netherlands (NL) 
28.11 Government introduces an urban toll from 2001. 
Austria (A) 
5.11 The Parliament approves the reform of the public officials' pension sys­
tem. The reform aims at an alignment of the officials' pension system with pri­
vate sector systems, including the introduction of a calculation period for pen­
sion assessment. 
6.11 In order to implement the 1998 budget proposal, the Parliament adopts 
various changes to regulations concerning public prices, which are intended 
to increase government revenues by 1 % of GDP in 1998. 
7.11 The Parliament approves a reform of various Social Insurance Laws, 
centred on the inclusion of disincentives for early retirement, the extension of 
the number of insured beneficiaries and an increase in the upper limit for so­
cial security contributions. 
Portugal (P) 
18.11 Social security pensions increase by 4% on average from 1 December 
1997; the pensioners with the lowest pensions receive the largest increase. 
18.11 The Bank of Portugal lowers the repo rate by 20 basis points to 5.3%. 
Finland (SF) 
26.11 The central organisations of employers and employees reach agree­
ment on a comprehensive wage settlement, which will increase wages by 
2.5% on average in 1998 and by 1.6% in 1999. If the settlement is implem­
ented in actual branch-level agreements by 11 December, the government 
will ease the taxation of earned income: employees' sickness insurance con­
tribution down by 0.4 of a percentage point in 1998 and further in 1999. In 
1999, also the tax-exempt part of earned income in local taxation will be in­
creased, and the income tax rates reduced by 0.5 of a percentage point except 
in the highest income bracket. 
Sweden (S) 
None. 
United Kingdom (UK) 
6.11 The Bank of England raises official interest rates to 7Vi% from 7% with 
immediate effect. 
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